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 Internet worms pose a major threat to Internet infrastructure security, and their 
destruction causes loss of millions of dollars. Therefore, the networks must be protected as much 
as possible to avoid losses. This thesis proposes an accurate system for signature generation for 
Zero-day polymorphic worms.  
Thesis consists of two parts: 
In part one, polymorphic worm instances are collected by designing a novel Double-
honeynet system, which is able to detect new worms that have not been seen before. Unlimited 
honeynet outbound connections are introduced to collect all polymorphic worm instances. 
Therefore this system produces accurate worm signatures. 
In part two, signatures are generated for the polymorphic worms that are collected by the 
Double-honeynet system. Both a Modified Knuth-Morris-Pratt (MKMP) Algorithm, which is 
string matching based, and a Modified Principal Component Analysis (MPCA), which is statistics 
based, are used. The MKMP algorithm compares the polymorphic worms substrings to find the 
multiple invariant substrings that are shared between all polymorphic worm instances and use 
them as signatures. The MPCA determines the most significant substrings that are shared between 
polymorphic worm instances and use them as signatures.   
The experimental results show that the Modified Knuth-Morris-Pratt Algorithm and 
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Malware: Malware is a common name for all kinds of unwanted software such as viruses, 
worms, and Trojans. 
Virus: A computer virus is a program that copies itself into (infects) other programs. It may or 
may not perform other tasks. It can be passed by infected files on a disk, by files downloaded from 
another computer, or by attachments sent via e-mail. 
Worm: A computer worm is a program that spawns running copies of itself over a computer 
network and usually performs malicious actions, such as using up the computer’s resources and 
possibly shutting the system down. 
Polymorphic worm: A polymorphic worm is a computer worm that changes its appearance in 
every infection attempt. 
Vulnerability: Vulnerabilities open security holes that can allow other applications to connect to 
the computer system without authorization or knowledge of a legitimate user. 
Signature / Identifier: A signature is a set of characteristics that can identify a malware. 
Signatures are used by antivirus and antispyware products to determine if a file is malicious or 
not. 
Honeypot: A honeypot is a security resource whose value lies in being probed, attacked, or 
compromised.  
Honeynet: Honeynet is a network of standard production systems that are built together and are 
put behind some type of access control device (such as a firewall) to watch what happens to the 
traffic. 
Sebek: Sebek is a data capture tool designed to capture all of the attacker's activities on a 
honypot, without the attacker knowing it. 











purpose is to capture all ‘attacker's activities’ (Keystrokes, file uploads, passwords) then covertly 
send the data to the sebek server. Since the sebek client runs as a kernel module on the honeypots, 
it can capture all activities, including encrypted, such as SSH, IPSec. 
Sebek Server: Sebek server is one of the sebek components which collects the data from the 
honeypots. The sebek server normally runs on the honeywall gateway. 
DoS: A Denial-of-Service attack is an attempt to make a computer resource unavailable to its 
intended users. 
IDS: Intrusion Detection System is software/hardware that detects and logs inappropriate, 
incorrect, or anomalous activity. 
IPS: Intrusion Prevention System is defined as an in-line product that focuses on identifying and 
blocking malicious network activity in real time. Essentially, a combination of access control 
(Firewall/router) mechanisms is termed an intrusion detection system.  
LAN: A Local Area Network (LAN) is a group of computers and associated devices that share a 
common communication line or wireless link. 
Honeywall CDROM: The Honeywall CDROM is a bootable CD that installs onto a hard drive 
and comes with all the tools and functionality for you to implement data capture, control, and 
analysis for multiple honeypot deployments.  
WAN: A Wide Area Network is a geographically dispersed telecommunications network. The 














Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Problem Definition and Motivation for the Thesis 
Computer Worm is a kind of malicious program that self-replicates automatically within a 
computer network. Worms are in general, a serious threat to computers connected to the Internet 
and its proper functioning. These malicious programs can spread by exploiting low-level software 
defects, and can use their victims for illegitimate activities; such as corrupting data, sending 
unsolicited electronic mail messages, generating traffic for distributed Denial of Service (DoS) 
attacks, or stealing information [2, 4]. Today the speed at which the worm propagates poses a 
serious security threat to the Internet.  Polymorphic worm is a kind of worm that is able to change 
its payload in every infection attempt, so it can evade the Intrusion Detection Systems, and 
damage data, delay the network, cause information theft, and other illegal activities that lead to 
even for example, high financial loss. To defend the network against the worm, intrusion detection 
systems (IDS) such as Bro and Snort are commonly deployed at the edge of network and the 
Internet. The main principle of these IDSs is to analyze the traffic to compare it against the 
signatures stored in their databases. Whenever a novel worm is detected in the Internet, the 
common approach is that the experts from security community analyze the worm code manually, 
and produce a signature. The signature is then distributed and each IDS updates its database with 
this new signature. 
This approach of creating signature is human intensive, very slow and when we have threats of 
very fast replicating worms (that take as small as few seconds to bring down the entire network) 
like zero day worms, the need of an alternative is recognized. The alternative approach is to find a 
way to automatically generate signatures that are relatively faster to generate and are of 
acceptable good quality. Our work is concerned to do an automated signature generation for 
zero-day polymorphic worms, so that we can secure the network of the universities, education 












1.2 Internet Worm Defense Methods    
Due to the enormous threat from the worms, many efforts have been taken previously to 
tackle worms by detecting and preventing them. Later in this thesis, the relevant works are 
discussed, however in this section, internet worm defense methods and their limitations are 
mentioned in brief.  
One avenue to deal with worms is prevention. We usually know that prevention is better 
than cure. Since worms need to exploit software defects, by eliminating all software defects we 
could eradicate worms. While theoretically this seems to be easy, the reality finds this as an almost 
impossible goal. Although, significant progress has been made on software development, testing, 
and verification, empirical evidence [62] suggests that we are still far from producing defect-free 
software.  
Another avenue to solve the worm problem is containment. Containment systems accept 
that software has defects that can be exploited by worms, and they strive to contain a worm 
epidemic to a small fraction of the vulnerable machines. The main challenge in designing 
containment systems is that they need to be completely automatic, because worms can spread far 
faster than humans can respond [40, 63, 60]. Recent works on automatic containment [7, 8, 9, 
64] have explored network-level approaches. These rely on heuristics to analyze network traffic 
and derive a packet classifier that blocks or rate-limits forwarding of worm packets. 
It is hard to provide guarantees on the rate of false positives and false negatives with these 
approaches because there is no information about the software vulnerabilities exploited by worms 
at the network level. False negatives allow worms to escape containment, while false positives 
may cause network outages by blocking normal traffic. We believe that automatic containment 
systems will not be widely deployed unless they have a negligible false positive rate. 
It should be noted here that dealing with the prevention mechanisms is out of the scope of 












1.3 Automated Zero-day Worm Detection 
Bearing the difficulty of tackling worms in mind, in this section, we briefly discuss how 
our proposed Double-honeynet mechanism solves the existing limitations on the current worm 
detection systems.  
We propose a Double-honeynet system to collect all polymorphic worm instances 
automatically without human interaction and to generate a signature based on the collected worm 
patterns. The Double-honeynet system is a hybrid system (Network-based and Host-based).  The 
system operates at the Network-level by filtering unwanted traffic using Local Router and 
operates at the Host-level by allowing polymorphic worms to interact with Honeynet 1 and 
Honeynet 2 hosts. Interaction between the two honeynets works by forming a loop which allows 
us to collect all polymorphic worm instances. This mechanism reduces the false positives and false 
negatives dramatically which is the general limitation of the current worm detection systems.    
1.4 Contributions to Automated Signature Generation Systems 
The major contributions of this thesis are: 
 Design of a novel Double-honeynet system, which is able to detect worms that are 
not seen before 
 We introduce unlimited honeynet outbound connections that allow us to collect all 
polymorphic worm instances which enable our system to produce accurate worm 
signatures.  
 Ability of the system to generate signatures to match all Polymorphic worm 
instances. 
 The Double-honeynet system is a hybrid system with both Network-based and 
Host-based. This allows us to collect polymorphic worm instances on the network-












These contributions are documented in the following selected peer reviewed publications: 
1. Mohssen M. Mohammed, H Anthony Chan, Neco Ventura, Mohsin Hashim, And 
Eihab Bashir, “Polymorphic Worms Detection Using A Supervised Machine 
Learning Technique”, will be appeared on The 2012 International Conference on 
Security and Management (SAM'12) Las Vegas, USA, July 2012, 16 – 19.  
2. Mohssen M. Mohammed, H Anthony Chan, Neco Ventura, Mohsin Hashim, and 
Izzeldin Amin, "Zero-day Polymophic Worms Detection Using a Modified Boyer-
Moore Algorithm" Proceedings of the 2010 International Conference on Security 
and Management (SAM 2010), Las Vegas, USA, 12-15 July 2010. 
3. Mohssen M. Z. E. Mohammed, H. Anthony Chan, Neco Ventura, Mohsin 
Hashim,Izzeldin Amin, "Accurate Signature Generation for Polymorphic Worms 
Using Principal Component Analysis," to appear in Proceedings of IEEE 
Globecom 2010 Workshop on Web and Pervasive Security (WPS 2010), Miami, 
Florida, USA,6-10 December 2010. 
4. Mohssen M Z E Mohammed, H Anthony Chan, Neco Ventura, Mohsin Hashim, 
and Eihab Bashier, "Fast and Accurate Detection for Polymorphic Worms," The 
5th International Conference for Internet Technology and Secured Transactions 
(ICITST-2010),London, UK. 
5. Mohssen M. Z. E. Mohammed, H. Anthony Chan, Neco Ventura, Mohsin Hashim, 
and Izzeldin Amin, "Polymorphic Worm Detection Using Double-Honeynet," 
Proceedings of The Fourth International Conference on Software Engineering 
Advances (ICSEA 2009), Porto, Portugal, 20-25 September 2009. IEEE 
Computer Society. ISBN 9780769537771. 
6. Mohssen M. Z. E. Mohammed, H. Anthony Chan, Neco Ventura, Mohsin Hashim, 
and Izzeldin Amin, "A modified Knuth-Morris-Pratt Algorithm for Zero-day 
Polymorphic Worms Detection," Proceedings of The 2009 International 











2009. IEEE. ISBN 9781601321244. 
7. Mohssen Mohammed and H. Anthony Chan, "Honeycyber: Automated Signature 
Generation for Zero-day Polymorphic Worms," accepted at IEEE Military 
Communications Conference (MILCOM), San Diego, USA, 17-19 Nov. 2008. 
ISBN: 978-1-4244-2677-5. 
8. Mohssen M. Z. E. Mohammed, H. Anthony Chan, Neco Ventura, "Fast 
Automated Signature Generation for Polymorphic Worms Using Double- 
Honeynet," Proceedings of 3rd International Conference on Broadband 
Communications, Information Technology & Biomedical Applications (BroadCom 
2008), Pretoria, South Africa, 23-26 November 2008. 
9. Mohssen M. Mohammed, H Anthony Chan, Neco Ventura, Mohsin Hashim, And 
Izzeldin Amin, " An Automated Signature Generation Approach for Polymorphic 
Worms Using Principal Component Analysis", the proceedings of the International 
Journal for Information Security Research (IJISR), Volume 1, Issue 1, March 
2011, pp. 53-62 ,ISSN: 2042- 4639 (Online). 
1.5 Organization of This Thesis 
This thesis is organized as follows: after the introductory information in Chapter 1, 
Chapter 2 reviews worm attacks. Chapter 3 discusses prevention and detection approaches and 
literature review. Chapter 4 introduces the proposed Double-honeynet architecture to address the 
problems faced by current automated signature systems, and analysis of the outcomes and results. 
Signature generation algorithms for polymorphic worm and experimental implementation results 













Chapter 2 Preliminaries of Worm and Worm Attacks  
As noted earlier, worms are computer programs that self-replicate without requiring any 
human intervention, especially by sending copies of their code in network packets and ensuring 
the code is executed by the computers that receive it. When computers become infected, they 
spread further copies of the worm and possibly perform other malicious activities [2, 4]. 
2.1 Worm Infection 
Remotely infecting a computer requires coercing the computer into running the worm 
code. To achieve this, worms exploit low-level software defects, also known as vulnerabilities. 
Vulnerabilities are common in current software, because today’s software is usually large, 
complex, and mostly written in unsafe programming languages. Several different classes of 
vulnerabilities have been discovered over the years. Currently, buffer overflows, arithmetic 
overflows, memory management errors, and incorrect h ndling of format strings, are among the 
most common types of vulnerabilities exploitable by worms [40]. 
While we should expect new types of vulnerabilities to be discovered in the future, the 
mechanisms used by worms to gain control of a program’s execution should change less 
frequently. Currently, worms gain control of the execution of a remote program using one of 
three mechanisms: injecting new code into the program, injecting new control-flow edges into the 
program (e.g., forcing the program to call functions that shouldn’t be called), and corrupting data 
used by the program. 
2.2 Spread of Internet Worms 
After infecting a computer, worms typically use it to infect other computers, giving rise to 
a propagation process which has many similarities with the spread of human diseases. 
The spread of the worm in its most basic sense depends most greatly on how it chooses its 
victims. This not only affects the spread and pace of the worm network, but also its survivability 











Internet to find hosts and attack. However, new attack models have emerged that demonstrate 
increased aggressiveness [2, 4]. 
2.2.1 Random Scanning  
The simplest way for a worm to spread as far as it can is to use random network scanning. 
In this method, the worm node randomly generates a network to scan. This worm node then 
begins to search for potential victims in that network space and attacks vulnerable hosts. This 
random walk is the classic spread model for network-based worms. 
2.2.2 Random Scanning using lists  
In this method, the worm carries a list of numbers used to assist in the generation of the 
networks to probe and attack. This list is built from assigned and used address space from the 
Internet. By using this approach, the worm is able to focus on locations where hosts are likely to 
be present, improving the worm’s efficiency. 
2.2.3 Island Hopping  
The third type of network scanning that worms perform is typically called island hopping. 
This is so named because it treats network blocks as islands on which it focuses attention before 
hopping away to a new, random destination. 
2.2.4 Directed Attacking  
Another targeting and direction method that can be used by a worm is that of directing its 
attack at a particular network. In this scenario, a worm carries a target network to penetrate and 
focuses its efforts on that network. This type of worm attack would be used in information 
warfare. 
2.2.5 Hit-list Scanning  
Hit list contains the addresses and information of nodes vulnerable to the worm’s attacks. 











would scan the Internet to find 50,000 hosts vulnerable to a particular Web server exploit. This 
list is carried by the worm as it progresses, and is used to direct its attack. When a node is 
attacked and compromised, the hit list splits into half and one-half remains with the parent node 
and the other half goes to the child node. This mechanism continues and the worm’s efficiency 
improves with every permutation. 
2.3 Worm Components 
There are five basic components of worm [2, 4]: 
2.3.1 Reconnaissance 
The worm network has to hunt out other network nodes to infect. This component of the 
worm is responsible for discovering hosts on the network that are capable of being compromised 
by the worm’s known methods. 
2.3.2 Attack Components     
These are used to launch an attack against an identified target system. Attacks can include 
the traditional buffer or heap overflow, string formatting attacks, Unicode misinterpretations (in 
the case of IIS attacks), and misconfigurations. 
2.3.3 Communication Components 
Nodes in the worm network can talk to each other. The communication components give 
the worms the interface to send messages between nodes or some other central location. 
2.3.4 Command Components    
Once compromised, the nodes in the worm network can be issued operation commands 
using this component. The command element provides the interface to the worm node to issue 












2.3.5 Intelligence Components 
To communicate effectively, the worm network needs to know the location of the nodes 
as well as characteristics about them. The intelligence portion of the worm network provides the 
information needed to be able to contact with other worm nodes, which can be accomplished in a 
variety of ways. 
2.4 Worm Examples  
In this section, we give examples of Internet worms [2, 3, 4]. These examples contain one 
of the first computer worms distributed via the Internet which is known as Morris worm, then we 
show which vulnerabilities and operating systems the worm would target, and the high speed of 
worms spreading in the network and infecting computers. These examples also show instances of 
polymorphic worms. 
2.4.1 Morris Worm  
On the evening of November 2, 1988, a self-replicating program was released to attack 
the Internet. The program, later called the Morris worm, invaded VAX and Sun-3 computers 
running versions of Berkeley UNIX and used their resources to attack more computers. Within 
the space of hours this program had spread across the United States, infecting thousands of 
computers and making many of them unusable due to the burden of its activity. Although the 
worm was designed to spread itself to as many computers as possible and took only a tiny process 
to be unnoticeable, it did work strikingly due to mistakenly underestimating its spreading power 
and overload. As time passed by, some of these affected machines became so loaded with running 
processes (because they were repeatedly affected) that they were unable to continue any 
processing. Some machines failed completely when their swap space or process tables were 
exhausted. 
2.4.2 Melissa  
The Melissa Worm was first recognized on 26th March 1999, it was the first major mail 











Melissa contained a Word macro virus (Macro viruses are computer viruses that use an 
application's own macro programming language to distribute themselves). This particular type of 
worm could spread in a semi-active manner. It attacked Microsoft's Outlook and Word programs 
(Any time an infected user attached a Word document with an email, this email would be sent to 
the first 50 addresses in the recipients' address book, if they had used Outlook as the email client). 
2.4.3 Sadmind  
A On May 8, 2001, a self-propagating malicious worm, Sadmind/IIS, was created. The 
worm uses two vulnerabilities to compromise systems and deface Web pages. It affects systems 
running unpatched Microsoft Internet Information Server (IIS) and systems running unpatched 
Solaris up to version 7. Intruders can use the vulnerabilities exploited by this worm to execute 
arbitrary code with root privileges on vulnerable Solaris systems and arbitrary commands with the 
privileges of the IUSR machinename account on vulnerable Windows systems. 
2.4.4 Code Red I and Code Red II  
In 2001, two worms exploited the same vulnerability to disturb the Internet: Code Red I 
on July 19 and Code Red II on August. Both of them exploited the vulnerability of buffer 
overflow bugs in Microsoft IIS Indexing Service DLL. They affected Microsoft Windows NT 4.0 
with IIS 4.0 or IIS 5.0 enabled and Index Server 2.0 installed, Windows 2000 with IIS 4.0 or IIS 
5.0 enabled and Indexing services installed and other systems running IIS. More than 250,000 
hosts suffered from their attacks. 
2.4.5 Nimda 
On September 18, 2001, a worm, named W32/Nimda or Concept Virus (CV) v.5, 
propagated in the Internet to attack systems running Microsoft Windows 95, 98, ME, NT,and 
2000. With the worm, intruders can execute arbitrary commands within the LocalSystem security 
context on machines running unpatched versions of IIS. In the case in which a client is 
compromised, the worm will run with the same privileges as the user who triggered it. The 












2.4.6 SQL Slammer  
On January 25 2003, a worm referred to as SQL Slammer, W32.Slammer, or Sapphire 
caused varied levels of network performance degradation across the Internet. This worm affects 
Microsoft SQL Server 2000 and Microsoft Desktop Engine (MSDE) 2000. The high volume of 
user datagram protocol (UDP) traffic generated by the infected hosts may lead to performance 
degradation against Internet-connected hosts or those computers that stay on the same network of 
a compromised host. The worm exploits the vulnerability of stack buffer overflow in the 
Resolution Service of Microsoft SQL Server 2000 and MSDE 2000 so that an intruder can 
execute arbitrary code with the same privileges as the SQL server. 
2.4.7  Blaster Worm 
On August 11, 2003, a worm, named Blaster, was launched. It affects computers running 
Microsoft Windows NT 4.0, Microsoft Windows 2000, Microsoft Windows XP, and Microsoft 
Windows Server 2003. This worm exploits vulnerability in the Microsoft Remote Procedure Call 
(RPC) interface. This vulnerability affects a distributed component object model (DCOM) 
interface with RPC, which listens on TCP/IP port 135. This interface handles the DCOM object 
activation requests that are sent by client machines to the server. Due to incorrect handling of 
malformed messages exchanged over TCP/IP, an attacker can use buffer overflow to execute 
arbitrary code with system privileges or cause denial of service. 
2.4.8 Sasser Worm  
Sasser worm is a network worm that was first detected in April 2004. Sasser worm 
exploits buffer overflow vulnerability in the Windows Local Security Authority Service Server 
(LSASS) on TCP port 445. The vulnerability allows a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code 
with system privileges. 
2.4.9  Conficker Worm 
Conficker is a computer worm that targets the Microsoft Windows operating system 











Server Service on Windows computers, in which an already-infected source computer uses a 
specially-crafted RPC request to force a buffer overflow and executes shellcode on the target 
computer. On the source computer, the worm runs an HTTP server on a port between 1024 and 
10000; the target shellcode connects back to this HTTP server to download a copy of the worm 
in DLL form, which is then attached to svchost.exe. 
2.4.10 Allaple Worm  
Allaple worm is a network worm designed for the Windows platform that was first 
detected in August 2008. Once it is executed, Allaple will search local disks for HTML files and 
inject code into them to activate the installed copy of it. Some variants of Allaple may spread to 
other network computers by exploiting common buffer overflow vulnerabilities, including: 
SRVSVC (MS06-040), RPC-DCOM (MS04-012), PNP (MS05-039) and ASN.1 (MS04-007) 
and by copying itself to network shares protected by weak passwords. 
2.5 Polymorphic Worms: Definition and Anatomy 
2.5.1 Polymorphic Worm Definition 
A polymorphic worm is a computer worm that changes its appearance in every infection 
attempt [2, 3, 4]. 
2.5.2 Polymorphic Worm Structure  
As stated in [66], in a sample of polymorphic worm, we can identify the following 
components: 
Protocol framework. To infect new hosts and continue their spread, worms have to 
exploit a given vulnerability. This vulnerability, in many cases, is associated with a particular 
application code and execution path in this code. This execution path can be activated by few, or 
much often one type of particular protocol request. 
Exploit bytes. These bytes are used by the worm to exploit the vulnerability. They are 











Worm body. These bytes contain instructions executed by the worm instances on new 
infected victims. In polymorphic worms, these bytes can assume different values in each instance. 
Polymorphic decryptor. The polymorphic decryptor decodes the worm body and starts 
its execution. 
Others bytes. These bytes do not affect the successful execution of both the worm body 
and exploit bytes. 
2.5.3 Invariant Bytes  
In a polymorphic worm sample, we can classify three kinds of bytes: invariant, code, and 
wildcard [66]. 
Invariant bytes are those with a fixed value in every possible instance. If their values are 
changed, the exploit no longer could work. They can be part of the protocol framework and 
exploit bytes but in some cases, also of the worm body or the polymorphic decryptor. Such bytes 
are very useful in signature generation because they are absolutely necessary for the exploit to 
work and their content is replicated across worm instances. Code bytes come from components 
like the worm body or decryption routine, in which there are instructions to be executed. 
Although code section of worm samples can be subjected to polymorphism and encryption 
techniques, and thus they can assume different shapes in each instance, polymorphic engines are 
not perfect and some of these bytes can present invariant values. Lastly, wildcard bytes are bytes 
that may take any value without affecting worms’ spreading capabilities. 
2.5.4 Signature Classes for Polymorphic Worms   
Signatures for polymorphic worms can be classified into two broad categories: Content-
based signatures that aim at using similarity in different instances of byte sequences to 
characterize a given worm, and Behavior-based signatures that aim at characterizing worms 
through understanding the semantics of their byte sequences. Our work focuses on Content-based 
signatures. An advantage of Content-based signatures is that they allow us to treat the worms as 











Content-based signatures can easily be incorporated into firewalls or NIDSs. 
2.5.5 Polymorphic Worm Techniques 
The attackers will try every possible way to extend the life time of Internet worms. In 
order to evade the signature-based system, a polymorphic worm appears differently each time it 
replicates itself. This section discusses the polymorphism of Internet worms and polymorphic 
worm anatomy. 
There are many ways to make polymorphic worms [12, 55, 56, 58, 59]. One technique 
relies on self encryption with a variable key. It encrypts the body of a worm, which erases both 
signatures and statistical characteristics of the worm byte string. A copy of the worm, the 
decryption routine, and the key are sent to a victim machine, where the encrypted text is turned 
into a regular worm program by the decryption routine. The program is then executed to infect 
other victims and possibly damage the local system. If the same decryption routine is always used, 
the byte sequence in the decryption routine can serve as the worm signature. 
A more sophisticated method of polymorphism is to change the decryption routine each 
time a copy of the worm is sent to another victim host. This can be achieved by keeping several 
decryption routines in a worm. When the worm tries to make a copy, one routine is randomly 
selected and other routines are encrypted together with the worm body. The number of different 
decryption routines is limited by the total length of the worm. Given a limited number of 
decryption routines, it is possible to identify all of them as attack signatures after enough samples 
of the worm have been obtained. 
Another polymorphism technique is called garbage-code insertion. It inserts garbage 
instructions into the copies of a worm. For example, a number of nop (i.e., no operation) 
instructions can be inserted into different places of the worm body, thus making it more difficult 
to compare the byte sequences of two instances of the same worm. However, from the statistics 
point of view, the frequencies of the garbage instructions in a worm can differ greatly from those 
in normal traffic. If that is the case, anomaly-detection systems can be used to detect the worm. 











better obfuscated garbage, techniques of executable analysis can be used to identify and remove 
those instructions that will never be executed.  
The instruction-substitution technique replaces one instruction sequence with a different 
but equivalent sequence. Unless the substitution is done over the entire code without 
compromising the code integrity (which is a great challenge by itself), it is likely that shorter 
signatures can be identified from the stationary portion of the worm. The code-transposition 
technique changes the order of the instructions with the help of jumps. The excess jump 
instructions provide a statistical clue, and executable-analysis techniques can help remove the 
unnecessary jump instructions. Finally, the register-reassignment technique swaps the usage of the 
registers, which causes extensive “minor” changes in the code sequence. 
2.6 Chapter summary 
In this chapter, we have discussed how a worm infects a computer in a network and starts 
spreading to infect other computers in the network using worm components collaboration. We 
have mentioned some examples of worms and the vulnerabilities that they exploit. We looked at 
the structure of polymorphic worm which helps infection and spreading in a network. Moreover, 



















Chapter 3 Prevention and Detection Approaches and 
Literature Review     
This chapter contains two parts. The first part discusses the approaches that are used to 
prevent and detect the Internet worms. In addition, we discuss the attack detection technologies 
such as Intrusion Detection System (IDS), Firewalls, and Honeypots. The second part discusses 
the related works regarding automated signature generation systems for polymorphic worms.  
3.1 Prevention and Detection of Worms 
There are several sub-problems to the problem of worms. A worm is after all a program 
that remotely exploits some vulnerability in some application and hijacks the control flow of that 
application. So, the genesis of the problem is in the vulnerability that can be remotely exploited. 
Thus, prevention of such vulnerabilities comes first and then the attacks that exploit them form 
the first problem to deal with.  
However, there is a large legacy of programs already in use that cannot be discarded 
overnight or cannot be relieved of such vulnerabilities easily. Given that there are also several 
undiscovered vulnerabilities in existing programs, it is fair to assume that exploits will be written 
for them by attackers who find them. So, detection of these attacks forms the second problem to 
be addressed. 
3.1.1 Prevention 
There are two different approaches to prevent worm attacks. One is to prevent 
vulnerabilities. Second one is to prevent exploitation of vulnerabilities. Such prevention not only 
guards against worm attacks but also intrusions of any kind [4]. 
3.1.1.1 Prevention of vulnerabilities 
Secure Programming languages and practices: Most, not all, vulnerabilities can be 
avoided by good programming practices and secure design of protocols and software 











trusts will make them vulnerable. Protocols and software architectures can be proved or verified 
by theorem provers such as HOL [19] but there is always a chance for human error and 
carelessness even in the most careful of programmers. Also, C [21], the most common language 
with which critical applications are programmed due to the efficiency and low-level control of 
data structures and memory that it offers, does not inherently offer safe and secure constructs. 
Vulnerabilities such as buffer overflows in C programs are possible, though caused by human-
errors, because it is legitimate to write beyond the array and string boundaries in C. Thus, there is 
a need for more secure programming and execution environments. Fortunately, help is available 
for securing programs in the form of: 
1.  Static analysis tools which identify programming constructs in general that can 
lead to vulnerabilities. Lint is one of the most popular tools of such kind. LCLint 
[22, 23], is another one. MOPS  [24, 25] is a model checking tool to examine 
source code for conformity to certain security properties. These properties are 
expressed as predicates and the tool uses model-checking to verify conformation. 
Metal [26, 27], and SLAM [28] are two more examples of such types of tools.  
2.  Run-time checking of program status by the use of assert statements in C, but they 
are usually turned off in the production versions of the software to avoid 
performance degradation [29].  
3. A combination of both of the above. Systems such as CCured [30] perform static 
analysis a d automatically insert run-time checks where safety cannot be 
guaranteed statically. These systems can also be used to retort legacy C code to 
prevent vulnerabilities.  
4. Safe Languages offer the most promise. These languages such as Java and Cyclone 
[29] offer no scope for vulnerabilities. Cyclone, a dialect of C, ensures this by 
enforcing safe programming practices - it refuses to compile unsafe programs such 
as those that use uninitialized pointers; revoking some of the privileges such as 
unsafe casts, setjmp, longjmp, implicit returns, etc., that were available to C 











combination of static analysis and inserting run-time checkers or assertions. 
However, Java's type-checking system can itself be attacked exposing Java programs and Java 
virtual machines to danger [67]. Moreover, high level languages such as Java do not provide the 
low-level control that C provides. Whereas, Cyclone, provides a safer programming environment 
by a combination of static-analysis and inserting run-time checks, yet maintaining the low-level of 
control that C offers to the programmers.   
Secure execution environments: A secure execution environment can also make sure 
that there are no vulnerabilities. A straightforward approach to provide a secure execution 
environment is to instrument each memory access with assertions for memory integrity. 
Purify [32] is a tool that adopts this approach for C programs. However, it has a high 
performance penalty that prevents it from being used in the production environment. It can 
however be used as a debugger. 
3.1.1.2 Prevention of exploits 
Though a long list of mechanisms are available for prevention of vulnerabilities, no single 
tool's (or mechanism's) coverage is complete. Moreover, some of the tools are hard to use or have 
severe performance penalties and hence, are not used in production environments. Therefore, 
software continues to be shipped with vulnerabilities and attackers continue to write exploits. 
Even if all future systems ship without any vulnerability, there is a huge legacy of systems with 
vulnerabilities. Preventing exploits of those vulnerabilities, both known and unknown, is thus 
convenient. There are several perspectives from which this is achieved. 
1. Access Control Matrix and Lists (OS Perspective): Traditionally, the responsibility 
for preventing mischief, data theft, accidents and deliberate vandalism and 
maintaining the integrity of computer systems has been taken up by the operating 
system. This responsibility is satisfied by controlling access to resources as dictated 
by the Access Control Matrix [33, 34]. Each entry in this matrix specifies the set of 
access rights to a resource that a process gets when executing in a certain 











domains are defined to be users and the Access Control Matrix is implemented as 
an Access Control List. This is in addition to the regular UNIX file permissions 
based on user groups, thus allowing arbitrary subsets of users and groups [36]. 
2. Firewalls and IPS (Network Perspectives) - Another way to prevent exploits is to 
filter exploit traffic at the network level based on certain rules and policies. Such 
traffic filtering is implemented mostly at the border gateways of networks and 
sometimes at the network layer of the network protocol stack on individual 
machines. An example policy is to never accept any TCP connection from a 
particular IP address. Another example may be to drop connections whose packet 
contents match of a certain pattern. The former is usually enforced by some kind of 
software called a firewall; for example, netfilters' iptables [38]. The latter is 
enforced by Intrusion Prevention Systems based on signatures; as an example, 
Snort-inline. There is another class of closely related software called Intrusion 
Detection Systems, which we will talk about shortly. 
3. Deterrents (Legal Perspective): Several technical and legal measures have been 
undertaken to deter mischief mongers from tampering with computer systems. 
Enactment and enforcement of laws in combination with building up of audit trails 
[37] on computers (to serve incriminating evidence) have contributed to a great 
extent to securing computers. 
3.2 Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs)  
The research community has proposed and built intrusion detection systems (IDSs) to 
defend against Internet worms (and other attacks) [53, 54].  Intrusion detection is the process of 
monitoring computers or networks for unauthorized entrance, activity, or file modification. IDS 
can also be used to monitor network traffic, thereby detecting if a system is being targeted by a 
network attack such as a denial of service attack.  
There are two basic types of intrusion detection: host-based and network-based. Host-











IDSs examine data exchanged between computers. 
There are two basic techniques used to detect intruders: Anomaly Detection and Misuse 
Detection (Signature Detection).  Anomaly Detection is designed to uncover abnormal patterns 
of behavior, the IDS establishes a baseline of normal usage patterns, and anything that widely 
deviates from it gets flagged as a possible intrusion. Although these systems can detect previously 
unknown attacks, they have high false positives when the normal activities are diverse and 
unpredictable. Misuse detection (signature detection), which is commonly called Signature 
Detection uses specifically known patterns of unauthorized behavior to predict and detect 
subsequent similar attempts. These specific patterns are called signatures. They can detect the 
known worms but will fail on the new types. 
Most deployed worm-detection systems are signature-based, which belongs to the Misuse 
detection category. They look for specific byte sequences (called attack signatures) that are 
known to appear in the attack traffic. The signatures are manually identified by human experts 
through careful analysis of the byte sequence from captured attack traffic. A good signature 
should be one that consistently shows up in attack traffic but rarely appears in normal traffic. 
3.3 Firewalls 
Firewall is a system designed to prevent unauthorized access to or from a private network. 
Firewalls can be implemented in both hardware and software, or a combination of both. Firewalls 
are frequently used to prevent unauthorized Internet users from accessing private networks 
connected to the Internet, especially intranets. All messages entering or leaving the intranet pass 
through the firewall, which examines each message and blocks those that do not meet the 
specified security criteria [1, 3]. 
There are several types of firewall techniques: 
 Packet filter: Looks at each packet entering or leaving the network and accepts or 
rejects it based on user-defined rules. Packet filtering is fairly effective and 












 Application gateway: Applies security mechanisms to specific applications, such as 
FTP and Telnet servers. This is very effective, but can impose performance 
degradation. 
 Circuit-level gateway: Applies security mechanisms when a TCP or UDP 
connection is established. Once the connection has been made, packets can flow 
between the hosts without further checking. 
 Proxy server: Intercepts all messages entering and leaving the network. The proxy 
server effectively hides the true network addresses. 
3.4 Honeypots 
A honeypot is a security resource whose value lies in being probed, attacked, or 
compromised. This means that whatever we designate as a honeypot, our expectations and goals 
are to have the system probed, attacked, and potentially exploited. It does not matter what the 
resource is (a router, scripts running emulated services, a jail, an actual production system). What 
does matter is that the resource's value lies in its being attacked. If the system is never probed or 
attacked, then it has little or no value. This is the exact opposite of most of the production 
systems, which we usually do not want to be probed or attacked [1]. 
3.4.1 The Value of Honeypots 
Honeypots are a highly flexible technology that can be applied to a variety of situations. 
As security tools, they have specific advantages. Specifically, honeypots collect small amounts of 
data, but most of this is information of high value. They have the ability to effectively work in 
resource intensive environments, and conceptually they are very simple devices. Also, they quickly 
demonstrate their value by detecting and capturing unauthorized activity. 
However, honeypots share several major disadvantages. The most critical is that they have 











can be fingerprinted, making detection possible. The third disadvantage is that honeypots can add 
additional risk: The honeypot may be used to attack or harm other systems or organizations. Any 
time we add additional services or applications to our environment, there are more things that can 
go wrong. 
Within the three areas of security—prevention, detection and response—the primary value 
of production honeypots is detection. Because, production honeypots greatly reduce the problem 
of both false negatives and false positives; they make a highly efficient technology for detecting 
unauthorized activity. They also have some value with respect to reaction and, in relation to this, 
helping organizations to develop their incident response skills. For prevention purposes, 
production honeypots are of minimal value. The concepts of deception and deterrence can be 
applied with honeypots to prevent attacks, but most of the organizations are better off spending 
their limited resources on security best practices, such as patching vulnerable services. Honeypots 
will not stop vulnerable systems from being hacked. 
Research honeypots do not mitigate risk, but they primarily are used to gain information 
about threats. This information is then used to better understand and protect against these threats. 
When deploying honeypots, it is critical that organizations have a clearly defined security policy 
stating what activity is and is not authorized, including the use of honeypots to detect and monitor 
[1]. 
3.4.2 Honeypots types 
Level of interaction gives us a scale with which we could measure and compare 
honeypots. The more a honeypot can do and the more an attacker can do to a honeypot, the 
greater the information that can be derived from it. However, by the same token, the more an 
attacker can do to the honeypot, the more potential damage an attacker can incur. Honeypots fall 
into three categories which are Low-Interaction Honeypots, Mid-Interaction Honeypots, and 
High-Interaction Honeypots [1].  
3.4.2.1 Low-Interaction Honeypots 











maintain because of their simple design and basic functionality. Normally, these technologies 
merely emulate a variety of services. The attacker is limited to interacting with these pre-
designated services. For example, a low-interaction honeypot could emulate a standard Unix 
server with several running services, such as Telnet and FTP. An attacker could Telnet to the 
honeypot, get a banner that states the operating system, and perhaps obtain a login prompt. The 
attacker can then attempt to login by brute force method or by guessing the passwords. The 
honeypot would capture and collect these attempts, but there is no real operating system for the 
attacker to log on to. The attacker's interaction is limited to login attempts. 
3.4.2.2 Mid-Interaction Honeypots 
Medium-interaction honeypots offer attackers more ability to interact than the low-
interaction honeypots do, but have less functionality than those of the high-interaction solutions. 
They can expect certain activity and are designed to give certain responses beyond what a low-
interaction honeypot would give. For example, perhaps there is a worm scanning for specific IIS 
vulnerabilities. A honeypot could be built to imitate a Microsoft IIS Web server, including the 
additional functionality that normally accompanies the application. The emulated IIS Web server 
could then be customized to present whatever functionality or behavior the specific worm is 
looking for. Whenever an HTTP connection is made to the honeypot, it would respond as an IIS 
Web server, giving the attacker the opportunity to interact with actual IIS functionality. This level 
of interaction is greater than the low-level honeypot, which would have most likely simply 
presented an HTTP banner. In the case of the worm, our intent is for it to attack the honeypot so 
we can capture the worm payload for future analysis. However, the worm has not been given a 
full operating system with which to interact, limiting risk. There is only an emulated application. 
As such, this would not be a high level of interaction. 
3.4.2.3 High-Interaction Honeypots 
High-interaction honeypots are the highest levels of honeypot technologies. They give us a 
vast amount of information about attackers, but they are extremely time consuming to build and 
maintain, and also they come with the highest level of risk. The goal of a high-interaction 
honeypot is to give the attacker access to a real operating system where nothing is emulated or 











applications, and learn how blackhats communicate among one other. The possibilities are almost 
limitless, making high-interaction honeypots an extremely powerful weapon. 
3.4.3 Honeynet 
Honeynets are high-interaction honeypots. In fact, it is difficult to envisage any other 
honeypot solution that can offer a greater level of interaction than honeynets do. The concept of a 
Honeynet is simple: Building a network of standard production systems, just as we would find in 
most organizations today. Putting this network of systems behind some type of access control 
device (such as a firewall) and watching what happens. Attackers can probe, attack, and exploit 
any system within the Honeynet, giving them full operating systems and applications to interact 
with. No services are emulated, and no caged environments are created. The systems within a 
Honeynet can be anything: a Solaris server running an Oracle database, a Windows XP server 
running an IIS Web server, a Cisco router, etc. In short, the systems within a Honeynet are true 
production systems [1]. 
3.4.4 Virtual Honeynets 
Virtual Honeynets represent a relatively new field for Honeynets. The concept is to 
virtually run an entire Honeynet on a single, physical system. The purpose of this is to make 
Honeynets a cheaper solution that is easier to manage. Instead of investing in large amounts of 
hardware, all of the hardware requirements are combined into a single system [1]. 
3.5 Related Works Regarding Automated Signature Generation 
Systems 
Previously proposed techniques to mitigate worm attacks can be divided into network-
based and host-based mechanisms. Network-based mechanisms exclusively analyze network 
traffic, while host-based systems use information available at the end-hosts. This chapter discusses 












3.5.1 Network-based mechanisms 
One of the first systems proposed was Honeycomb developed by Kreibich and Crowcroft. 
Honeycomb generates signatures from traffic observed at a honeypot via its implementation as a 
Honeyd [7] plugin. The longest common substring (LCS) algorithm, which looks for the longest 
shared byte sequences across pairs of connections, is at the heart of Honeycomb. Honeycomb 
generates signatures consisting of a single, contiguous substring of a worm’s payload to match all 
worm instances.   
Kim and Karp [8] described the Autograph system for automated generation of signatures 
to detect worms. Unlike Honeycomb, Autograph’s inputs are packet traces from a DMZ 
(Demilitarized Zone) that includes benign traffic. Content blocks that match “enough” suspicious 
flows are used as inputs to COPP, an algorithm based on Rabin fingerprints that searches for 
repeated byte sequences by partitioning the payload into content blocks. Similar to Honeycomb, 
Autograph generates signatures consisting of a single, contiguous substring of a worm’s payload 
to match all worm instances.   
S. Singh, C. Estan, G. Varghese, and S. Savage [9] described the Earlybird system for 
generating signatures to detect worms. This system measures packet-content prevalence at a 
single monitoring point such as a network DMZ. By counting the number of distinct sources and 
destinations associated with strings that repeat often in the payload, Earlybird distinguishes benign 
repetitions from epidemic content. Earlybird, also like Honeycomb and Autograph, generates 
signatures consisting of a single, contiguous substring of a worm’s payload to match all worm 
instances.   
The above systems generate a single signature to match all worm instances based on the 
assumption that there exists a single payload substring that will remain invariant across worm 
connections. Single signature is not qualified enough to match all worm instances with low false 
positives and low false negatives. Our polymorphic worm signature is based on the idea that there 
are more than one substring(s) that are shared between all polymorphic worm instances.  











13, 14] that have been deployed. All these systems, similar to our system, generate automated 
signatures for polymorphic worms based on the following fact: there are multiple invariant 
substrings that must often be present in all variants of polymorphic worm payloads, even if the 
payload changes in every infection. All these systems capture the packet payloads at the network 
level. Polymorphic worm does not change its payload till it reaches the host level, so these 
systems cannot capture the remaining instances of the polymorphic worm. However, the systems 
may capture different types of polymorphic worms where each of them exploits a different 
vulnerability from each other. So, in this case, it may be difficult for these systems to find invariant 
contents shared between these polymorphic worms, because they exploit different vulnerabilities. 
We propose a Double-honeynet system to capture all polymorphic worm instances automatically 
without human interaction. The interactions between the two honeynets allow us to capture the 
remaining instances of the polymorphic worm. 
 An Architecture for Generating Semantics-Aware Signatures by Yegneswaran, J. Giffin, 
P. Barford, and S. Jha [11] described Nemean. Nemean incorporates protocol semantics into the 
signature generation algorithm. By doing so, it is able to handle a broader class of attacks. The 
coverage of Nemean is wide, which makes us believe that our system is better in dealing with 
polymorphic worms especially. 
An Automated Signature-Based Approach against Polymorphic Internet Worms by Yong 
Tang and Shigang Chen [12] d scribed a system to detect new worms and generate signatures 
automatically. This system implemented a double-honeypots (inbound honeypot and outbound 
honeypot) to capture worms payloads. The inbound honeypot is implemented as a high-
interaction honeypot, whereas the outbound honeypot is implemented as a low-interaction 
honeypot. This system has some limitations. The outbound honeypot is not able to make 
outbound connections because it is implemented as low-interaction honeypot which is not able to 
capture the remaining instances of the polymorphic worm. Our system overcomes this 
disadvantage by using a Double-honeynet system (high-interaction honeypot), which enables us to 
make unlimited outbound connections between them, so we can capture the remaining instances 











3.5.2 Host-based mechanisms  
TaintCheck [41] and Vigilante [40] benefit from knowledge about the state of the host 
during an attack. They perform dynamic dataflow analysis to track program activity, including 
buffer overflows and control transfers. They identify worm signatures in terms of program 
behavior rather than packet payload. 
Buttercup [39] proposed identifying the return address range used in worm attack 
messages and filtering messages that include such addresses. To reduce false positives, their 
system searches for the return address value starting at a predetermined offset in messages, and 
stops after a configurable number of bytes have been checked. While Buttercup requires these 
addresses to be externally specified, TaintCheck [41] proposed to obtain them automatically, by 
using the exact return address observed in attack messages. These systems can have false 
positives, because the 4 byte sequences used as a return address can appear in normal messages. 
The system can also have false negatives, since attackers can use a wide range of values of return 
addresses, by searching the address space of vulnerable applications for sequences of bytes that 
correspond to instructions that transfer control to the worm code. 
ARBOR [18] generates signatures based on the size of network messages and the fraction 
of non-ASCII characters in them. Its signatures also include host context: messages are dropped 
at specific code locations, and when specific call sequences are observed. ARBOR can still have 
false positives and false negati es. 
COVERS [17] also generates signatures based on length of inputs and fraction of non-
ASCII characters in them, but includes an input correlation mechanism to identify attack packets 
and the specific bytes in those packets that were involved in an observed security fault.  COVERS 
does not provide guarantees on the rate of false positives or false negatives. 
There is no approach used in the above motioned systems to collect all polymorphic worm 
instances. Therefore, signatures produced by these systems suffer from high false positives. The 
Double-honeynet system provides a solution to collect all polymorphic worm instances. 











polymorphic worm instances. This mechanism reduces the false positives and false negatives 
dramatically.    
3.6 Chapter summary 
 In this chapter, we have discussed the approaches for preventing and detecting worms 
which aim to provide a secure network. In addition, we discussed the attack detection 
technologies, namely: Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs), firewalls, and honeypots. A firewall is 
considered a first line of defense in protecting private information whereas the honeypot is a tool 
designed to gather the attacker activities; specifically the tools, tactics and, motives of attackers. 
Three types of honeypots have been mentioned which are Low-interaction honeypots, Mid-
interaction honeypots, and High-interaction honeypots. Honeynet has been mentioned as an 
example of High-interaction honeypots. To reduce the cost of applying the honeynet, there is a 
solution available now-a-days which is termed “Virtual honeynets” that provides an environment 
to gather multiple devices operating with different operating systems (OSs) on a single machine. 
In this work, virtual honeynet technique is used, which will be discussed later. We discussed the 
related works, and mentioned the features of our system that make it overcome the current 



















Chapter 4 Double-Honeynet: System Theory, and Results  
This chapter contains two parts. The first part discusses the design of Double-honeynet 
system in detail. The second part discusses the followings:   
 Brief introduction about the software used to implement the Double-honeynet 
system.  
  Analysis of the outcomes and results.          
4.1 Motivation of Double-honeynet System  
Unknown Internet worms pose a major threat to Internet infrastructure security, and their 
destruction causes loss of millions of dollars. Security experts manually generate the IDS 
signatures by studying the network traces after a new worm has been released. Unfortunately, this 
job takes a lot of time. We propose a Double-honeynet system that could automatically detect 
unknown worms without any human interaction. In our system, interaction between the two 
honeynets works by forming a loop which allows us to collect all polymorphic worm instances 
which enables the system to produce accurate worm signatures. The Double-honeynet system is a 
hybrid system with both Network-based and Host-based mechanisms. This allows us to collect 
polymorphic worm instances at the network-level and host-level, which reduces the false positives 
and false negatives dramatically.  
4.2 Double-Honeynet Architecture 
The purpose of our Double-honeynet system is to detect unknown (i.e., previously 
unreported) worms automatically. A key contribution of this system is the ability of distinguishing 
worm activities from normal activities without any involvement of experts in the field.  
Figure 1 shows the main components of the Double-honeynet system. Firstly, the 
incoming traffic goes through the Local Router which samples the unwanted inbound connections 











Local Router, Packet Capture (PCAP) library is used to capture the packets and then to analyze 












Figure 1. Double-Honeynet System 
The Local Router is configured with publicly-accessible addresses, which represent 
wanted services. Connections made to other addresses are considered unwanted and redirected to 
Honeynet 1 through the Internal Router. Once Honeynet 1 is compromised; the worm will 
attempt to make outbound connections to attack another network. The Internal Router is 
implemented to separate the Double-honeynet from the Local Area Network (LAN). This Router 
intercepts all outbound connections from Honeynet 1 and redirects those to Honeynet 2, which 
does the same task forming a loop [61]. The looping mechanism allows us to capture different 
instances of the polymorphic worm as it mutates on each loop-iteration.  
We stop the loop after a considerable amount of time in order to collect polymorphic 











in the Section (4.4).   
Only those packets that make outbound connections are considered as polymorphic 
worms, and hence the Double-honeynet system forwards only the packets that make outbound 
connections. This policy is in place due to the fact that benign users do not try to make outbound 
connections if they are faced with non-existing addresses. In fact, our system collects other 
malicious activities which do not intend to propagate themselves but to attack targeted machines 
only. Such malicious attack is out of our work scope.  
When enough instances of worm payloads are collected by Honeynet 1 and Honeynet 2, 
they are forwarded to the Signature Generator component which generates signatures 
automatically using specific algorithms. These algorithms will be discussed in Chapter 5.    
For example, as shown in Figure 1, if the Local Router suspects Packet 1 (P1), Packet 2 
(P2), and Packet 3 (P3) to be malicious, it redirects them to the Honeynet 1 through the Internal 
Router. Among these three packets, P1 and P2 make outbound connections and Internal Router 
redirects these outbound connections to Honeynet 2. In Honeynet 2, P1 and P2 change their 
payloads and become  1P  and 2P  respectively (i.e., 1P  and 2P are the instances of P1 and 
P2). Therefore, in this case, 1P  and 2P  make outbound connections and the Internal Router 
redirects these connections to Honeynet 1. In Honeynet 1, 1P  and 2P  change their payloads 
and become 1P  and  2 P  respectively (i.e., 1P  and  2 P  are also other instances of P1 and P2).  
Now, P1 and P2 are found malicious because of the outbound connections. Therefore, 
Honeynet 1 forwards P1, 1P , P2, 2 P  to the Signature Generator for signature generation 
process. Similarly, Honeynet 2 forwards 1P  and 2P  to the Signature Generator for signature 
generation process. 
In this scenario, P3 does not make any outbound connection when it gets to Honeynet 1. 












The software tools used in the Double-honeynet system are briefly introduced below. 
4.3.1 Honeywall Roo CDROM 
The honeywall Roo CDROM version 1.4 is downloaded from the Honeynet Project and 
Research Alliance. It provides data capture, control and analysis capabilities [51, 52]. Most 
importantly, it monitors all traffic that go in and out of the honeynet. Honeywall Roo CDROM 
runs Snort-inline, an Intrusion Prevention System based on the Intrusion Detection System Snort. 
Snort-inline either drops unwanted packets or modifies them to make them harmless. It records 
information of all the activities in the honeynet using Sebek. It runs the Sebek server, while the 
Sebek clients run on the honeypots. The clients then send all captured information to the server. 
For management and data analysis, it uses the Walleye Web interface. Walleye also works as a 
maintenance interface, but there is a command line tool and a dialog menu that can also be used to 
configure and maintain the honeywal. 
4.3.2  Sebek 
Sebek is a data capture tool which mainly records keystrokes, but also all other types of 
sys_read data [49]. It records and copies all activity on the machine including changes to files, 
network communications, etc. The main method it uses is to capture network traffic and 
reassemble the TCP flow. This is in the case of unencrypted data. Encrypted data is another 
problem, because Sebek can only reassemble it in its encrypted form. Instead of breaking the 
encryption, Sebek circumvents it by getting the data from the Operating System’s kernel. Sebek 
has a client-server architecture. On the client side, it resides entirely in the Operating System 
kernel. Whenever a system call is made, Sebek hijacks it by redirecting it to its own read() call. 
This way Sebek can capture the data prior to encryption and after decryption. 
After capturing the data, the client sends it to the server, which saves it in a database or 
simply logs the records. The server is normally on the honeywall machine in the case of a 
honeynet, and it collects data from all the honeypots and puts it all together for analysis. 
To prevent detection by intruders, Sebek employs some obfuscation methods. On the 











This is however not enough because the data captured has to be sent to the Server, thereby 
exposing itself. Sebek uses a covert channel to communicate with the server. It generates packets 
to be sent inside Sebek without using the TCP/IP stack and the packets are sent directly to the 
driver bypassing the raw socket interface. The packets are then invisible to the user and Sebek 
modifies the kernel to prevent the user from blocking transition of the packets. Figure 2 shows 
Sebek Deployment. 
 
Figure 2. Sebek Deployment 
In the case of multiple clients, there is a risk of the clients seeing each other’s packets. 
Sebek configures its own raw socket interface on the clients to ignore all incoming Sebek packets. 
Only the server can receive Sebek packets. Due to its comprehensive log capabilities, it can be 
used as a tool for forensics data collection. It has a Web interface that can perform data analysis. 
4.3.3 Snort-inline 
Snort_inline is a modified version of Snort. It is “an Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) 
that uses existing Intrusion Detection System (IDS) signatures to make decisions on packets that 
traverse snort_inline”. The decisions are usually drop, reject, modify, or allow [53]. The next 
section discusses results and analysis of the Double-honeyent system. Double-honeynet system 











4.4 Double-honeynet Results 
After the successful implementation of Double-honeynet network, we connected the 
Double-honeynet network to the Internet for seven days to collect attacks. Of course, we checked 
it periodically to make sure that the network is working properly, to see if the Honeywall serves 
its purposes, and to examine the data collected. During the seven days, our Double-honeynet 
system has collected different polymorphic worms instances and other attacks data. We used 
Walleye, the Honeywall’s Web graphical user interface, to analyze data. 
To simulate the detection of unknown polymorphic worms, we removed the current 
signature patterns for the Allaple, Conficker, Balster, and Sasser polymorphic worms from all the 
Snort instances so that our system can generate new signatures as if the worm is unknown (i.e., 
not previously recorded).  
Once our system has run with the activated polymorphic worm, a new signature would be 
generated that can be exported to Snort or Bro IDS. 
  Table 1 shows some samples of polymorphic worms that were captured by the Double-
honeynet system.  
 Table 1.  Polymorphic Worm Instances  
 
Polymorphic worm Number of instances 
Allaple worm 3511 
Conficker worm 3228 
Blaster worm 2817 











4.5 Chapter Summary 
This chapter discussed two parts. In the first part, we gave full details about the Double-
honeynet system components. In the second part, we gave a brief introduction about the software 
used to implement the Double-honeynet system and showed the results that were collected for the 


























Chapter 5 Signature Generation Algorithms and 
Experimental Implementation Results 
 This chapter discusses two parts. The first part presents our proposed Substring Exaction 
Algorithm (SEA), Modified Knuth–Morris–Pratt (MKMP) algorithm, and Modified Principal 
Component Analysis (MPCA), which are used to generate worm signatures from a collection of 
worm variants captured by our Double-honeynet system. Pseudo codes for these algorithms will 
be discussed in Appendix A.  
To explain how our proposed algorithms generate signatures for polymorphic worms, we 
assume that we have a polymorphic worm A, that has n instances (A1, A2,.., An). Generating a 
signature for polymorphic worm A involves two steps:  
 First, we generate the signature itself.  
 Second, we test the quality of the generated signature by using a mixed traffic 
(new variants of polymorphic worm A, and normal traffic).  
Before stating the details of our contributions and the subsequent analysis part, we briefly 
mention an introduction about string matching search method and the original Knuth–Morris–
Pratt algorithm to give a clear picture of the subject topic.  
The second part discusses the implementation results of our proposed algorithms.   
5.1 An Overview and Motivation for Using String Matching  
After presenting the Double-honeynet system and its functions in the previous Chapter, in 
this and the following sections, we will describe Substring Exaction Algorithm (SEA), Modified 
MKMP algorithm, and Modified PCA to highlight our contributions.  
String matching [5] is an important subject in the wider domain of text processing. String 
matching algorithms are basic components used in implementations of practical software used in 











serve as paradigms in other fields of computer science (system or software design). Finally, they 
also play an important role in theoretical computer science by providing challenging problems. 
String matching generally consists of finding a substring (called a pattern) within another 
string (called the text). The pattern is generally denoted as, 
x= x[0..m-1] 
Whose length is m and the text is generally denoted as 
y=y[0..n-1] 
Whose length is n. Both the strings-pattern and text are built over a finite set of characters 
which is called the alphabet and denoted by Σ whose size is denoted by σ. 
The string matching algorithm plays an important role in network intrusion detection 
systems (IDS), which can detect malicious attacks and protect the network systems.  In fact, at 
the heart of almost every modern intrusion detection system, there is a string matching algorithm. 
This is a very crucial technique because it allows detection systems to base their actions on the 
content that is actually flowing to a machine. From a vast number of packets, the string identifies 
those packets that contain data, matching the fingerprint of a known attack. Essentially, the string 
matching algorithm compares the set of strings in the rule-set with the data seen in the packets, 
which flow across the network. 
Our work uses Substring Extraction Algorithm (SEA) and Modified Knuth–Morris–Pratt 
(MKMP) algorithm (which are based on string matching algorithms), to generate signatures for 
polymorphic worm attacks. The SEA aims at extracting substrings from polymorphic worm, 
whereas MKMP algorithm aims to find out multiple invariant substrings that are shared between 
polymorphic worm instances and to use them as signatures.  
5.2 The Knuth–Morris–Pratt Algorithm (KMP) 
The Knuth–Morris–Pratt string searching algorithm (or, KMP algorithm) [5] searches for 











when a mismatch occurs, the word itself embodies sufficient information to determine where the 
next match could begin, thus bypassing re-examination of previously matched characters [5, 43]. 
Let us take an example to illustrate how the algorithm works. To illustrate the algorithm's 
working method, we will go through a sample run (relatively artificial) of the algorithm. At any 
given time, the algorithm is in a state determined by two integers, m and i. m denotes the position 
within S which is the beginning of a prospective match for W, and i denotes the index in W 
denoting the character currently under consideration. This is depicted at the start of the run, like: 
m: 01234567890123456789012 
S: ABC ABCDAB ABCDABCDABDE 
W: ABCDABD 
i: 0123456 
We proceed by comparing successive characters of W to "parallel" positional characters of 
S, moving from one to the next if they match. However, in the fourth step in our noted case, we 
get that S[3] is a space and W[3] is equal to the character D (i.e., W[3] = 'D'), which is a 
mismatch. Rather than beginning to search again at the position S [1], we note that no 'A' occurs 
between positions 0 and 3 in S except at 0. Hence, having checked all those characters previously, 
we know that there is no chance of finding the beginning of a match if we check them again. 
Therefore, we simply move on to the next character, setting m = 4 and i = 0.  
m: 01234567890123456789012 
S: ABC ABCDAB ABCDABCDABDE 
W:     ABCDABD 
i:     0123456 
  We quickly obtain a nearly complete match "ABCDAB", but when at W[6] (S[10]), we 
again have a discrepancy. However, just prior to the end of the current partial match, we passed 
an "AB" which could be the beginning of a new match, so we must take this into consideration. 
As we already know that these characters match the two characters prior to the current position, 
we need not check them again; we simply reset m = 8, i = 2, and continue matching the current 
character. Thus, not only do we omit previously matched characters of S but also previously 













S: ABC ABCDAB ABCDABCDABDE 
W:         ABCDABD 
i:         0123456 
We continue with the same method of matching, till we match the word W. 
5.2.1 Proposed Substrings Extraction Algorithm (SEA)  
In this subsection, we show how our proposed Substring Extraction Algorithm (SEA) is 
used to extract substrings form one of the polymorphic worm variants that are collected by the 
Double-honeynet system. 
This subsection and the next one (5.2.2) show the signature generation process for 
polymorphic worm A using the SEA and a Modified Knuth–Morris–Pratt Algorithm (MKMP 
algorithm). The procedure of testing the quality of the generated signature will be discussed in 
Subsection (5.2.3)  
Let us assume that we have a polymorphic worm A, that has n instances (A1,..., An) and 
Ai has length Mi for i=1,…,n. Assume that A1 selected to be the instance from which we extract 
substrings and the A1 string contains a1 a2 a3... am1. Let, X to be the minimum length of a 
substring that we are going to extract from A1. The first substring from A1 with length X, is (a1 
a2 ... ax). Then, we shift one position to the right to extract a new substring, which will be (a2 
a3... ax+1). Continuing this way, the last substring from A1 will be (am1-X+1... am1). In general, 
if instance Ai has length equal to M, and let a minimum length of the substring that we are going 
to extract from A1 equals to X, then the Total Number of Substrings (TNS) that will be extracted 
from Ai could be obtained by this equation:  
TNS (Ai) = M-X+1 
The next step is to increase X by one and start new substrings extraction from the 
beginning of A1. The first substring will be (a1 a2 ... ax+1). The substrings extraction will 











Figure 3 and Table 2 show all substrings extraction possibilities using the proposed 
Substring Extraction Algorithm (SEA) from the string ZYXCBA assuming the minimum length of 
X is equal to three. 
ZYXCBA
Green line X= 3. The substrings are ZYX, YXC, XCB, CBA 
Blue line X=4. The substrings are ZYXC, YXCB, XCBA
Red line X=5. the substrings are ZYXCB, YXCBA
 
Figure 3. Extraction Substrings 
Table 2.  Substrings Extraction  
 
The output of the SEA will be used by both the Modified Knuth–Morris–Pratt Algorithm 
(MKMPA) and the Modified PCA (MPCA) method. The MKMPA uses the substrings extracted 
No. of Subtractions Length of X Substrings 
S1,1 3 ZYX 
S1,2 3 YXC 
S1,3 3 XCB 
S1,4 3 CBA 
S1,5 4 ZYXC 
S1,6 4 YXCB 
S1,7 4 XCBA 
S1,8 5 ZYXCB 











by the SEA to search the occurrences of each substring in the remaining of the instances (A2, 
A3,…,An ). The substrings that occur in all the remaining instances will be considered as worm 
signature. To clarify some of the points noted here, we will present the details of MKMPA in the 
next subsection. 
5.2.2 A Modified Knuth–Morris–Pratt Algorithm (MKMP algorithm) 
In this subsection, we describe our modification on Knuth-Morris-Pratt Algorithm. As we 
mentioned in Section (5.2), the Knuth-Morris-Pratt algorithm searches for occurrences of W 
(word) within S (text string). Our modification on the KMP algorithm is to search for occurrence 
of different words (W1, W2…, Wn) within string text "S". For example, say we have a 
polymorphic worm, A with N instances (A1, A2,..., An). Let us select A1 to be the instance from 
which we would extract substrings. If 9 substrings are extracted from A1, each substring will be 
Wi for i= 1 to 9. That means, A1 has 9 Words (W1, W2…, W9) whereas the remaining instances 
(A2, A3,..., An) are considered as  S “text string” [65]. 
Considering the above example, the Modified KMP algorithm (MKMP) algorithm 
searches the occurrences of W1 in the remaining instances of S (A2, A3,..., An). If W1 occurs in 
all remaining instances of S, then we consider it as signature otherwise we ignore it. The other 
words (W2 , W3, ,…, W9)  are similarly dealt with.  Just as an example, if W1, W5 ,W6, and W9 
occur in all remaining instances of S, then W1, W5 ,W6, and W9 are considered a signature of the 
polymorphic worm A.  
5.2.3 Testing the quality of the generated signature for Polymorphic Worm A 
We test the quality of the generated signature for polymorphic worm A by using a mixed 
traffic (new variants of polymorphic worm A & normal traffic, i.e. innocuous packets). The new 
variants of polymorphic worm A are not the same variants that are used to generate the signature. 
Let us assume that our system received a packet P (where P contains either malicious or 
innocuous data). The MKMP algorithm compares P payload against the generated signature to 











considers P as a new variant of the polymorphic worm A, if all the substrings of the generated 
signature appear in P.   
5.3 A Modified Principal Component Analysis (MPCA)  
Before introducing the MPCA, we give a brief introduction and motivation of using PCA 
statistical method in our work. Then we will illustrate the MPCA which contains our 
contributions in the PCA. 
5.3.1 An Overview and Motivation of Using PCA in Our Work 
In general, when presented with the need to analyze a high dimensional structure, a 
commonly-employed and powerful approach is to seek an alternative lower-dimensional 
approximation to the structure that preserves its important properties. A structure that can often 
appear complex because of its high dimension may be largely governed by a small set of 
independent variables and so can be well approximated by a lower dimensional representation. 
Dimension analysis and dimension reduction techniques attempt to find these simple variables and 
can therefore be a useful tool to understand the original structures. The most commonly used 
technique to analyze high dimensional structures is the method of Principal Component Analysis 
[46]. Given a high dimensional object and its associated coordinate space, PCA finds a new 
coordinate space which is the best one to use for dimension reduction of the given object. Once 
the object is placed into this new coordinate space, projecting the object onto a subset of the axes 
can be done in a way that minimizes error. When a high-dimensional object can be well 
approximated in this way in a smaller number of dimensions, we refer to the smaller number of 
dimensions as the object’s intrinsic dimensionality. 
5.3.2 Our Contributions in the PCA  
This subsection, Subsection (5.3.3), and Subsection (5.3.4) show the signature generation 
process for polymorphic worm A using a Modified Principle Component Analysis (MPCA). 
Testing the quality of the generated signature will be discussed in Subsection (5.3.5).  











it to fit it with our mechanism. Our contribution in the PCA method is in combining the PCA (i.e., 
extend) with the proposed Substring Extraction Algorithm (SEA) to get more accurate and 
relatively faster signatures for polymorphic worms. The extended method (SEA & PCA) is 
termed Modified Principle Component Analysis (MPCA). We have previously mentioned that the 
polymorphic worm evades the IDSs by changing its payload in every infection attempts; however, 
there are some invariant substrings that will remain fixed (i.e., some substrings will not change) in 
all polymorphic worm variants, so the Substring Extraction Algorithm (SEA) extracts substrings 
from polymorphic worm by a good way (i.e., it will extract all the possibilities of substrings from 
a polymorphic worm variant, which contain worm signature) that helps us to get accurate 
signatures. After the SEA extracts the substrings, it will pass those to the PCA, thus easing the 
heavy burden to the PCA in terms of time (i.e., the PCA directly will start by determining the 
Frequency Count of each substring in rest of the instances without doing substring extraction 
process). 
After the PCA receives the substrings from SEA, it will determine the Frequency Count of 
each substring in the remaining instances (A2, A3…, An). Lastly, the PCA will determine the 
most significant data on the polymorphic worm instances and use them as signature [50]. We 
present the details in the next subsection.  
5.3.3 Determination of Frequency Counts 
Here, we determine the frequency count of each substring Si (A1 substrings), in each of 
the remaining instances (A2 ,..., An). Then, we apply the Principal Component Analysis (PCA) on 
the frequency count data to reduce the dimension and get the most significant data. 
5.3.4 Using PCA to Determine the Most Significant Data on Polymorphic 
Worm Instances 
The methodology of employing PCA to the given problem is outlined below. 
Let Fi denotes the vector of frequencies ( 1iF ,..., iNF ) of the substring Si  in the instances 











We construct the frequency matrix F by letting Fi be the 
thi  row of F, provided that Fi is 






















5.3.4.1 Normalization of data 
The normalization of the data is applied by normalizing the data in each row of the matrix 































5.3.4.2 Mean adjusted data 
To get the data adjusted around zero mean, we use the formula: 
kiddg iikik ,  
 
Where id  = mean of the 
thi  vector 





































5.3.4.3 Evaluation of the covariance matrix    
Let gi denotes the 
thi  row of G, then the covariance between any two vectors gi and gj is 
given by: 
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5.3.4.4 Eigenvalue Evaluation 
Evaluate the eigenvalues of the matrix C from its characteristic polynomial IC    = 0, 
and then, compute the corresponding eigenvectors. 
5.3.4.5 Principal Component Evaluation 
Let L1, L2,…, LN be the eigenvalues of the matrix C obtained by solving the 
characteristic equation 
IC 
 = 0. If necessary resort the eigenvalues of C such in a descending 
order such that | L1|>=…>=| LN|. Let V1, V2,...,VN be the eigenvectors of matrix C 
corresponding to the eigenvalues L1, L2,…, LN. The k principal components are given by V1, 
V2,..., VK where K<=N.  
5.3.4.6 Projection of data adjust along the Principal Component 
Let V be the matrix which has the k principal components as its columns. That is  
V = [V1, V2,..., VK] 
Then the feature descriptor is obtained from the equation 











To determine the threshold of polymorphic worm A, we use a distance function 
(Euclidean distance) to evaluate the maximum distance between the rows of F and the rows of 
FD. The maximum distance R works as a threshold. The Euclidean distance theory will be 
discussed in Section (5.4).   
5.3.5 Testing the quality of generated signature for Polymorphic Worm A 
In the above subsection, we calculated the Feature Descriptor (FD) and threshold for 
polymorphic worm A. In this subsection, we test the quality of generated signature for 
polymorphic worm A by using a mixed traffic (new variants of polymorphic worm & normal 
traffic i.e. innocuous packets), the new variants of polymorphic worm A are ot the same variants 
that are used to generate the signature.  
  Let us assume that our system received a packet P (where P contains either malicious or 
innocuous data). The MPCA performs the following steps to determine whether P is a new 
variant of polymorphic worm A or not: 
 Determine frequencies of the substrings of W array in P, (W array contains 
extracted substrings of A1, as we mentioned earlier). This will produce a 
frequency matrix F1.  
 Calculate the distance between the polymorphic worm FD and F1 using Euclidean 
distance. This will produce a distance matrix D1.  
 Compare the distances in D1 to the threshold R of polymorphic worm A. If 
any <= the threshold, classify P as a new variant of polymorphic worm A.     
5.4 Clustering Method for Different Types of Polymorphic Worms  
 When our network receives different types of polymorphic worms (mixed polymorphic 
worms), we must first separate them into clusters and then generate signatures to each cluster as 
the same as in section (5.2, and 5.3). To perform the clustering we use Euclidean distance which 











similarity in the nearest neighbor method [46]. Let X=( X1, X1,..., Xp)' and Y= (Y1, Y2,..., Yp)' . 
The Euclidean distance between X and Y is: 
 
5.5  MATLAB and Experiments Done in Our Work 
MATLAB is a high-level technical computing language and interactive environment for 
algorithm development, data visualization, data analysis, and numeric computation. Using the 
MATLAB product, one can solve technical computing problems faster than that of using 
traditional programming languages, such as C, C++, and Fortran. We can use MATLAB  in a 
wide range of applications, including signal and image processing, communications, control 
design, test and measurement, financial modeling and analysis, and computational biology. 
MATLAB provides a number of features for documenting and sharing our work. We can 
integrate our MATLAB code with other languages and applications, and distribute MATLAB 
algorithms and applications [16]. 
We perform experiments to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed signature 
generation algorithms which are Modified Knuth–Morris–Pratt (MKMP algorithm) and Modified 
Principal Component Analysis (MPCA) in identifying polymorphic worms. The malicious 
payloads of Conficker worm, Allaple worm, Blaster worm, and Sasser worm are used in the 
experiments.  200 instances of each of the above worms are used in this experiment. We use 100 
instances from each of the worms for signature generation. The rest of the instances are mixed 
with normal traffic (i.e. innocuous packets) to test the quality of the generated signature of each 
of the worms. We used Matlab code running on a PC with Intel Pentium 4, 3.19-GHZ CPU and 
8.00 GB RAM.   
We consider mixed traffic as worm and normal traffic. The percentages of worm and 












5.6  Signature Generation process for Polymorphic Worms Using 
Modified Knuth–Morris–Pratt Algorithm (MKMP Algorithm)  
In this section, we show how we generate signatures for polymorphic worms using 
Modified Knuth–Morris–Pratt Algorithm (MKMP algorithm). The generation of signatures 
involves two steps: First, we generate the signature itself. Second, we calculate the detection rate, 
false positives and false negatives to test the quality of the generated signatures.  
5.6.1 Signature Generation Process  
Here, we describe the signature generation process for Allaple worm, Conficker worm, 
Blaster worm, and Sasser worm. 
Figures 4, 5, 6, and 7 show the experimental results for the above four worms based on 
Modified Knuth–Morris–Pratt algorithm (MKMP algorithm), which first identifies the invariant 
substrings that are shared between all worm instances. Second, the invariants substrings are used 
as signatures to match against the test instances. Based on the figures shown below we find that 
as the number of sample variants increases, the signature width decreases. A shorter signature 
increases the chance of appearing in normal traffic. Consequently, the false negative ratio 
decreases, but the false positive ratio increases dramatically. Again, as in the figures below, the 
false negatives increase dramatically when the number of the sample variants decrease. In order to 
get good results for our work in terms of detection rate, low false positives, and low false 
negatives, we removed the shorter signatures and longer signatures from the generated signatures. 
After we removed theses signatures (shorter and longer signatures), we got a high detection rate, 
zero false positives, and low false negatives as shown in section (5.6.2, and 5.6.3). 
From our analysis and experiments, we find that 100 samples for each worm are enough to 
generate accurate signatures. Because, as shown in the figures below, when we reached the last 
sample (sample number 100) of each worm, we found that the signature width became very short 
and it would increase the false positives dramatically. So, if we increase the number of samples 




























































Figure 7. Signature Generation Process for Sasser Worm 
5.6.2 MKMP Algorithm Detection Rate 
In the following, we test the quality of the generated signatures for the four worms in 
terms of detection rate. 
Figures 8, 9, 10, and 11 show detection rates of the four worms on mixed traffic (worm 
instances & normal traffic). The X-axis indicates number of worm instances and normal traffic, Y-


























































Figure 11. Sasser Worm Detection Rate 
5.6.3 False Positives and False Negatives Percentages 
In the following, we calculate the percentage of false positives and false negatives for the 
four worms. 
Figures 12, 13, 14, and 15 show the false positive and false negative percentages for the 
four worms. As shown in the figures, we get zero false positives whereas the false negatives 































































Figure 15. Sasser Worm False Positives and False Negatives 
 
  
















5.7  Signature Generation Process for Polymorphic Worms using 
Modified Principal Component Analysis (MPCA) 
The second method that we use to generate signatures for polymorphic worms is Modified 
Principal component analysis (MPCA) as we discussed in (5.3). 
5.7.1  Signature Generation Process 
In the following, we generate signature for Allaple worm, Conficker Worm, Blaster 
Worm, and Sasser Worm. Then, we calculate detection rate, false positives and false negatives to 
test the quality of the generated signature.   
5.7.1.1 Data before Reduction Process 
Now, we describe the worm payload before reduction process for the four worms.  
Figures 16, 17, 18, and 19 Show the worm payload before reduction process. The X-axis 
indicates the number of worm instances that are used to generate signature. The Y-axis indicates 
frequency count of the extracted substrings. The worm payload dimensions might be high before 













































































5.7.1.2 Data after Reduction Process 
In this part, we show how the MPCA can be used to reduce the dimension of the worm 
payload for the four worms without losing any significant data.   
Figures 20, 21, 22, and 23 show the most significant data obtained by the reduction of 
worm payload using the MPCA. It is noticed that the dimension of worm payload is reduced 
dramatically.       
 






























































5.7.1.3 Detection Rate 
Here, we test the quality of the generated signature of the four worms in terms of 
detection rate. 
Figures 24, 25, 26, and 27 show the worm detection rate for mixed traffic (worm 
instances & normal traffic). The X-axis indicates number of worm instances and normal traffic, Y-
axis indicates the worm detection rate. The detection rate increases as the number of instances 
increases. 
 





























































5.7.1.4 False Positives and Negatives Percentages   
In the following, we calculate the false positives and false negatives for the four worms. 
Figures 28, 29, 30, and 31 show the false positives and false negatives percentages for the 
four worms. We get zero false positives whereas the false negatives decrease as the number of 
worm instances increases.  
 





























































5.8  Clustering Method for Different Types of Polymorphic Worms 
5.8.1  Euclidean distance 
When our network receives different types of polymorphic worms (Mixed polymorphic 
worms), we must first separate them into clusters. As we mentioned in Section (5.4) we used the 
Euclidean distance to measure similarity in the nearest neighbor method. After the clustering is 
performed, we generate worm signature for each cluster in the same manner as we did in 
Subsection (5.2.1, 5.2.2, and 5.3.2).      
The purpose of this experiment is to evaluate the effectiveness of the Euclidean distance in 
solving the clustering problem. In this experiment, 100 instances of Conficker worm (Cw1, 
Cw2,…, Cw100) and 100 instances of Allaple worm (Aw1, Aw2,…, Aw100) are used. The 
Euclidean distance is used to separate the mixed 200 instances into clusters.  
The steps of the worms (Conficker and Allaple worms) separation process are described 
below:  
1. Randomly we select one instance of Conficker or Allaple worm instances. Let us 
assume that the selected instance is Aw1. 
2. We extract substrings form Aw1 using the same manner explained in Subsection 
(5.2.1). Then we save the extracted substrings into an array, called W array. 
3. We compute the frequency for each substring saved in W array in the remaining 
instances (Aw2,…,Aw100, Cw1,…, Cw100). Then we save the frequencies of 
each instance in a separate array. 
4. We apply Euclidean distance to determine the similarity between the Conficker and 












Figure 32 shows the clustering problem between two mixed polymorphic worms 
(Conficker worm and Allaple worm). The X-axis indicates the number of mixed polymorphic 
worm instances, and y-axis indicates the similarity values between the mixed polymorphic worm 
instances. By using the Euclidean distance, the 200 worm instances are separated into two 
clusters, one for Conficker worm and one for Allaple worm. 
As shown in Figure 32, we notice that the instances of the two worms lie in two different 
bands. To find the threshold between the two bands, we suppose that the band containing the 
Conficker worm instances lie above the band that contains the Allaple worm instances. Then we 
determine both the minimum value (denote it by minConficker) of the upper band and the 
maximum value of the lower band (denote it maxAllaple). The threshold is then given by: 
Threshold = (minConficker+maxAllaple)/2. 
With the same above way, the Euclidean distance can cluster more than two mixed 
polymorphic worms.  
  











5.8.2  Clustering and Signature Generation Process example 
Now, let us explain how our algorithms deal with mixed polymorphic worms environment. 
First, we separate the mixed polymorphic worms into clusters, and then we generate signatures 
for each cluster using the MKMP algorithm, and MPCA. Figure 33 shows clustering and 
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Figure 33. Clustering and Signature Generation for Mixed Polymorphic Worms 
 
5.9 Comparison between Our System and the Existing Systems  
In chapter 3, we gave accurate details about how our system outperforms the current 
automated signature generation systems for polymorphic worm. In addition to that discussion, the 
following table shows a comparison between our system and the currently existing automated 
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5.10 Chapter Summary 
The first part of this chapter discussed algorithms which are used to generate signatures 
for polymorphic worms. Substring Extraction algorithm (SEA) is used to extract substrings from 
one of the polymorphic worm instances. The chapter described a modified version of KMP 
algorithm named MKMP algorithm. The MKPM is a signature generator algorithm that searches 
the occurrence of different words (extracted substrings) on string text (remaining instances). 
MPCA is a signature generator statistical approach that is used to reduce dimension of worm 
payload, so that the most significant data appear and are used as worm signature. Euclidean 
distance has been used to solve the clustering problem. The second part showed experimental 
performance results and analysis for the signature generation algorithms which are Modified 
Knuth–Morris–Pratt algorithm (MKMP algorithm) and Modified Principal Component Analysis 
(MPCA) in identifying polymorphic worms. The experimental results showed that the MKMP 
algorithm and the MPCA successfully detected polymorphic worms with zero false positives and 
low false negatives. The MKMP algorithm proved to be better because it received less false 




















Chapter 6 Conclusion and Recommendations for Future 
Work 
The polymorphic worms evade signature-based Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) by 
changing their payloads in every infection attempt. This thesis designs a method for the detection 
of polymorphic worms attacks. The detection mechanism is based on two different approaches. In 
the first approach, a Double-honeynet system is proposed to collect all polymorphic worms 
instances. In the second approach, signatures are generated for the polymorphic worms instances 
that are collected by the Double-honeynet system. 
The Double-honeynet system successfully collected different polymorphic worm instances 
as shown in Table 1. Then, two different methods, Modified Knuth-Morris-Pratt algorithm 
(MKMP algorithm) and the Modified Principal Component Analysis (MPCA), have been used to 
generate signatures for the polymorphic worms.  
The MKMP algorithm compares the polymorphic worm substrings to find multiple 
invariant substrings which are shared among all polymorphic worm instances and are therefore 
used as the signatures of the polymorphic worm. 
The Modified Principal Component Analysis (MPCA) is used to determine the most 
significant data which are shared among all the polymorphic worm instances and are then used as 
the signatures. 
To test the efficiency of the proposed methods, malicious payloads of Conficker worm, 
Allaple worm, Blaster worm, and Sasser worm are used in the experiments. 200 instances of each 
of the above worms are used in this experiment, and 100 instances from each of the worms are 
used for signature generation. The rest of the instances are mixed with normal traffic to test the 
quality of the signature of each worm.  
The experimental results show that the MKMP algorithm and the MPCA have successfully 











It is recommended that for any real-life deployment of our system, real physical machines 
should be used with a multitude of different honeypots (running different operating systems and 
software applications) that will give the overall system the maximum ability to detect new zero-
day polymorphic worms.  
For future work, the system may be improved by using Artificial Intelligent (AI) 
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Appendix A: Signature Generation Algorithms Pseudo Codes 
In this appendix, we describe the signature generation algorithms pseudo codes.  These 
algorithms were discussed in Chapter 5, and as we mentioned there, generating a signature for 
polymorphic worm A involves two steps:  
• First, we generate the signature itself.  
• Second, we test the quality of the generated signature by using a mixed traffic 
(new variants of polymorphic worm A and normal traffic).  
1. Signature Generation Process  
This section shows the Pseudo Codes for generating a signature for polymorphic worm A 
using SEA, MKMPA and MPCA.   
1.1 Substring Extraction Algorithm (SEA) Pseudo Code  
In the following we describe the pseudo code of the Substring Extraction Algorithm 
(SEA) that was discussed in [5.2.1]. The goal of SEA is to extract substrings from the first 
instance of polymorphic worm A and then to put them in an array W.   
 
SEA pseudo code: 
 
1. Function SubstringExtraction:  
2. Input (a file A1: First instance of polymorphic worm A, x: minimum substring length) 
3. Output: (W: array of substrings of A1 with a minimum substring length x)  











Integer M : Length of file A1 
Integer X: Maximum substring length  
Integer z: (x<=z<=X) takes the lengths x to X 
Integer Tz: Total number of substrings of file A1 with a substring length z 
Integer position: the position of the first character of a substring of A1 with    
length z.  
Array of characters S: a substring of A1 with length z 
5. X= M-1 
6.     For  z := x to X Do 
7.               Set Tz = M-z+1 
8.                Set position = 0 
9.                           While  position <= Tz 
10.                                        S = A1 (position) to A1(position+z-1) 
11.                                        Append (W, S) 
12.                                        position←position +1 
13.                           EndWhile 
             EndFor 













1.2 Modified Knuth–Morris–Pratt (KMP) Algorithm 
Pseudo Code  
 In the following, we present the pseudo code for the Modified Kunth-Morris-Pratt algorithm 
(MKMP algorithm). Consider the example that we mentioned in Subsection (5.2.1) that we have a 
polymorphic worm with N instances (A1, A2,..., An). We select A1 to be the instance from which 
we extract substrings. If G substrings are extracted from A1, each substring will be equal to Wi 
for i= 1 to G. That means A1 has G Words (W1, W2,..., WG) whereas the remaining instances 
(A2, A3,..., An) are considered as  S “text string”. 
The MKMP algorithm contains two functions: 
a. kmpfound  Function 
kmpfound function is an MKMPA, which receives a word w from W array (W1, W2,…, WG) 
and a File S (one file of the remaining instances A2,…,An) and determines whether w can be found in S or 
not.   
b. SignatureFile Function 
SinatureFile function combined together with the above kmpfound function to get out 
the words (W1, W2,…, WG) that appear in all of the remaining instances (A2,…, An), and use 
them as worm signature.  
The MKMP algorithm has two inputs 
- The first input is the substrings of the W array (the output of the SEA)  
- The second input is the remaining instances (A2,…,An). 
The goal of MKMP algorithm is to determine which substrings of W array appear in all 













MKMP Algorithm Pseudo code: kmpfound Function  
  
1. Function kmpfound 
2. Inputs: 
    S: an instance of polymorphic worm A (A2, ..., An)  
    w: a word from file W to be searched in file S /* W is the Output of the SEA */ 
3. Output: 
    a boolean value (true if w is found in S, and false otherwise) 
4. Define variables: 
an integer, m ← 0 (the beginning of the current match in S) 
an integer, i ← 0 (the position of the current character in w) 
an array of integers, T (the table, computed elsewhere) 
5. while m+i is less than the length of S, do: 
6.      if  w[i] = S[m + i], 
7.               if  i equals the (length of w)-1, 
8.                        return true 
9.               let i ← i + 1 
10.            Otherwise, 











12.                           if T[i] is greater than -1, 
13.                                     let i ← T[i] 
14.                                 else 
15.                                     let i ← 0 
16.            Return false. 
 
 
MKMP Algorithm Pseudo code: SignatureFile Function  
  
1. Function SignatureFile  
2. Inputs: 
          W: Array of substrings of A1 
          A2, ..., An: Instances of worm A 
3. Output: 
SigFile : Array of substrings of A1 found in the rest instances (A2, ..., 
An) (Signature file contains the signature of the polymorphic worm A) 
4. Define variables: 
FoundInAll: boolean variables which takes the value true if a word w(j) is found 
in all files A2, ..., An 
5. SigFile = Null 











7.      FoundInAll = True 
8.      For k := 2 To n 
9.           Use function KMPFound to check whether word W(j) can be found 
in file Ak 
10.                     If W(j) is not found in file Ak 
11.              Set FoundInAll = False 
12.                         EndIf 
13.                  If FoundInAll 
14.              Append W(j) to file SigFile 
15.         EndIf 
16.      EndFor 
17.  EndFor 
18. Return SigFile 
 
1.3 Modified Principal Component Analysis (MPCA) 
Pseudo Code   
Here, we present the pseudo code of MPCA method which contains two functions: 
a. Compute Array of Frequencies Function, The goal of this function is to compute the 
frequencies of each substring in W array in the remaining instances (A2,..,An). W array contains 
the substrings extracted by the Substring Extraction Algorithm (SEA).  











output of this function is the frequencies of each W substring in the remaining instances 
(A2,…An).    
b. Compute Principal Component Function, This function computes the most important 
components and uses them as worm signature.  
The goal of this function is to extract the Feature Descriptor, which contains the most 
important features of polymorphic worm A.  
The input to this function is matrix FFF which is the output of the Compute Array of 
Frequencies Function. The output of this function is the Feature Descriptor of polymorphic 
worm A.     
 In the following we describe the pseudo codes for Compute Array of Frequencies 
Function and Compute Principal Component Function.    
   
Modified Principal Component Analysis (MPCA): Compute 
Array of Frequencies Function Pseudo code   
1. Function ComputeArrayOfFrequencies 
2. Inputs: (Instances A2,..,An, Array W)). 
3. Output (Matrix FF of frequencies of substrings of A1 stored in array W in files 
A2,...,An), and a vector of integers Zr) 
4. Define variables  
Integers: X,j,k, Wlength 
Matrices of Real:  FF, FFF (FFF is the matrix will be obtained by reducing all 
the zero rows of matrix FF) 











6. W := SubsringExtraction (A1, x) 
7. Wlength := Length (W) (number of substrings extracted in W array) 
8. FF = Matrix (Wlength, n-1) /* n is the number of polymorphic worm A instances */ 
9. for j from 1 To Wlength Do 
10.  for k from 1 to n-1 Do 
11.       set FF(j, k) be the frequency of word W(j) in file A(k+1) 
12.    EndFor 
13. EndFor 
14. Remove all zero rows from FF giving Matrix FFF of size Nx(n-1) and save indexes 
of zero rows in a vector Zr   
15. Return FFF and Zr 
 
 
Modified Principal Component Analysis (MPCA): Compute Principal 
Component Function Pseudo code: 
 
1. Function ComputePrincipalComponents:   
2. Inputs( FFF, K: Number of most important feature) 
3. Output (FD: a matrix of feature descriptors)  
4. Define variables:  











frequencies; G: matrix of Mean Adjusted Data; C: covariance Matrix; evecs: 
matrix of eigenvectors of covariance Matrix; evals: matrix of eigenvalues of 
covariance matrix; PC: matrix consisting set of principal component vectors) 
5. FFF = ComputeArrayofFrequnciesMatrix (A2,...An, W)  
6. FFFRows = Number of rows of FFF 
7. FFFCols = Number of columns of FFF 









9. Set id  (mean of the ith row of D) 
10. Compute matrix G = (gik) where gik= dik- id  







k dddd jjkiik  , ( C is 
NxN matrix) 
12. Compute the eigenvalues of C (λ1, λ2,..., λn) by solving IC    = 0, sorted in a 
descending order of their magnitudes.      
13. Compute the eignvetors of C V1, V2,..., Vn corresponding to the eigenvalues of C.   
14. Let  matrix V be the matrix whose columns are the eigenvectors vj^T (j=1,..,k) 
15. Compute the Feature Descriptor FD = V^T x FFF 
16. Return FD 
 
Pseudo Codes for testing the quality of the generated signature for polymorphic worm A 











2.   Testing the Quality of the Generated Signature for 
Polymorphic Worm A  
In this section, we show the MKMP algorithm and MPCA pseudo codes for testing the 
quality of the generated signature for polymorphic worm A (where this signature was generated in 
Section 1 by using SEA, KMP, and MPCA algorithms). To test the quality of the signature, we 
use a mixed traffic (new variants of polymorphic worm & normal traffic i.e. innocuous packets). 
The new variants of polymorphic worm A are not as the same as the variants that were used to 
generate the signature. (i.e. training set is A1,A2…An. Test set is An+1,….,Am,  where  m > n).   
In the following we describe the pseudo codes of the MKMP algorithm and MPCA that 
we use to test the quality of the generated signature for polymorphic worm A.     
 
Modified Knuth–Morris–Pratt (KMP) Algorithm Pseudo Code for 
testing the generated signature for polymorphic worm A     
  
 
1. Inputs: a packet P (which can be suspicious (An+1,..,Am) or innocuous packet), and 
SigFile which contains the signature of Polymorphic Worm A that was generated using 
SignatureFile function)  
  
 
2. Output: a boolean value (true if all substrings of SigFile are found in packet P, and false 
otherwise)  
 
3. If kmpFound (P, SigFile)   
     Retrurn True 
        Otherwise 














MPCA Pseudo Code for testing the quality of the generated 
signature for polymorphic worm A  
 
 
1. Inputs: a packet P (which can be suspicious (An+1,..,Am) or innocuous packet), W array, 
the vector Zr; and the Polymorphic worm A’s Feature Descriptor(FD) and threshold r which was 
calculated using the ComputePrincipalComponents function) 
 
2. Output: a boolean value (true if the Euclidean distance between the FD and Packet P <= r, 
and false otherwise)  
 
3. Define Variable  
Let k = number of rows of FD. 
 
4. Use function FunctionComputeArrayOfFrequencies to compute the frequencies of 
substrings of W array in Packet P, save the frequencies in a vector Fj and remove components 
of Fj indexed by Zr (Dimension of Fj is as same as FD).  
5.  Calculate the Euclidean distance between rows of FD and Fj Then save it a matrix Dt. 
 
6.  If for some j (1<=j<=k) the distance Dt(j) is less than the threshold value r,  return true, 





















Appendix B: Double-honeynet System Configurations  
  In the following we discuss the Double-honeynet system architecture, and configuration 
using Vmware.  
1. Double-honeynet Architecture Implementation 
In the following, we discuss the implementation of the Double-honeynet system on 
VMware. Figure 34, shows the architecture of the Double-honeynet system, implemented using 
VMware Workstation version 7 on PC Intel Pentium 4, 3.19-GHZ CPU, 8GB RAM, the PC 
running Windows XP 64-bit. The operating system of that personal computer is referred as host 
operating system in Figure 34. The host machine was connected to our home router and it 











































Figure 34. Double-honeynet Architecture 
We used virtual machine to deploy the Double-honeynet system due to the lack of 
resources and keeping the establishment low-cost. One personal computer (PC) was used and 
VMware Workstation was installed on it. The VMware Workstation is a software package that 
gives its users the opportunity to create virtual machines that constitute virtual networks 
interconnected with each other [48]. Thus, we created the Double-honeynet system as a virtual 
network seen from the outside world as an independent network. Attackers could locate the 
Honeypot and attack it. The Honeypot was transparently connected to the Internet through the 
Honeywall which in turn intercepted all outbound and inbound traffic. Therefore, malicious traffic 
targeting the Honeypot (inbound) or malicious traffic generated by the compromised Honeypot 
(outbound) were available to us from the Honeywall for further analysis and examination. As we 
mentioned in (4.2), Honeynet 1 and Honeynet 2 were configured to deliver unlimited outbound 
connections. The Internal Router was used to protect our local network by redirecting all 












In the following, we discuss the Double-honeynet configuration details. 
Our Double-honeynet system contains six components which are Local Router, Internal 
Router, LAN, Honeynet 1, Honeynet 2, and Signature Generator. The subnet mask for each 
subnet (whether Local Router, Internal Router, LAN, Honeynet 1, Honeynet 2, and Signature 
Generator) is consequently 255.255.255.0. The following subsequent sections discuss the 
configurations of each component. 
2.1 Local Router Configuration   
              As we mentioned in Section (4.2) Local Router’s function is to pass unwanted traffic to 
the Honeynet 1 through the Internal Router. For example, if the IP address space of our LAN is 
212.0.50.0/24, with one public Web server, the server's IP address is 212.0.50.19. If an attacker 
outside the network lunches a worm attack against 212.0.50.0/24, the worm scans the IP address 
space of victims. It is highly probable that an unused IP address, e.g. 212.0.50.10 will be 
attempted before 212.0.50.19. Therefore, Local Router will redirect the packet to Honeynet 1 
through Internal Router. After the worm compromised the Honeynet 1, the worm will try to make 
an outbound connection to harm another network.  We configured the Internal Router to protect 
the LAN from worms’ outbound connections. The Internal Router intercepts all outbound 
connections from Honeynet 1 and redirects them to Honeynet 2 which performs the same task 
being done by the Honeynet 1 forming loop connections. Below are the details of the Local 
Router machine properties and IPtables configuration. 
 Machine Properties:  
o Operating System: Ubuntu linux 9.10 
o Number of Network Cards:   
Three network cards (Eth0, Eth1, and Eth2).  











Eth1 function is to connect Local Router with Honeynet 1 through 
the Internal Router. 
o IP Addresses: 
 Eth1: 192.168.50.20 
o Prior to the IPtables setting, we enabled IP forwarding in the Local Router.    
-Edit  /etc/sysctl .conf  file as follows : 
Net.ipv4.ip_frowrd =1 
o IP-tables configuration 
The settings of the Network Address Translator (NAT) in the kernel using 
IPtables are as follows:   
1. Do not translate packets going to the real public server:  
# iptables -t nat -A PREROUTING -m physdev --physdev-in eth0 -d 
212.0.50.19 -j RETURN 
2. Translate all other packets going to the public LAN to Internal 
Router: 
# iptables -t nat -A PREROUTING -m physdev --physdev-in eth0 -d 
212.0.50.0/24 -j DNAT --to 192.168.50.22  
2.2 Internal Router Configuration 
          As we mentioned in Section (4.2), the Internal Router’s function is to protect the 
LAN from worms’ outbound connections and to redirect the outbound connections from 
Honeynet 1 to Honeynet 2 and vice versa. Let us investigate more about the Internal 












 Machine Properties 
o Operating System : Ubuntu linux 9.10 
o Number of Network Card: 
Four network cards (Eth0, Eth1, Eth2, and Eth3). 
Eth0 function is to connect Internal Router to the Honeynet1-clients. 
Eth1 function is to connect Internal Router with Local Router. 
Eth2 function is to connect Internal Router with Honeynet 2-clients. 
Eth3 function is to connect Internal Router with Signature generator. 
o IP Addresses: 
Eth0:  192.168.51.20 
Eth1: 192.168.50.22 
Eth2:  192.168.58.20 
Eth3 192.168.55.20 
o Before we set the Iptables rules we enable the IP Forwarding in Internal Router:   
-Edit  /etc/sysctl .conf  file as follows : 
Net.ipv4.ip_frowrd =1 
o IPtables configuration:  
The settings of the Network Address Translator (NAT) in the kernel using IPtables are 
as follows:     











# iptables -t nat -A PREROUTING -i eth1 -j DNAT --to 192.168.51.22 
2. From Honeynet 1 don't translate packets to the signature generator 
# iptables -t nat -A PREROUTING -i eth0 -s 192.168.51.22 -d 192.168.55.22 -j 
RETURN 
3. From Honeynet 1 translate all other packet to Honeynet 2 
# iptables -t nat -A PREROUTING -i eth0 -j DNAT --to 192.168.58.22 
4. From Honeynet 2 don't translate packets to the Signature generator 
# iptables -t nat -A PREROUTING -i eth0 -s 192.168.58.22 -d 192.168.55.22 -j 
RETURN 
5. From Honeynet 2 translate all other packet to Honeynet 1 
# iptables -t nat -A PREROUTING -i eth0 -j DNAT --to 192.168.51.22 
 
2.3 LAN Configuration    
              As described in Subjection (2.1), we have one public Web server in our LAN with this IP 
address: 212.0.50.19. Below are the details of the public web server machine properties. 
 Machine Properties: 
o Operating System:  Ubuntu linux 9.10 
o Number of Network Card: 
One network card Eth0. 
o IP Address:  











2.4 Honeynet 1     
              As shown in Figure 34, Honeynet 1 contains Honeywall and two Honeypots. The main 
function of the Honeynet 1 is to capture polymorphic worms instances. Below are the details of 
the Honeywall machine properties and configuration. 
 Machine properties: 
o Number of Network Cards: 
Three network cards (Eth0, Eth1, and Eth2). 
Eth0 function is to connect Honeynet 1 with Honeynet 2 through Internal Router. 
Eth1 function is to connect Honeynet 1 with his clients (Honeypots). 
Eth2: used for Management interface.   




o Honeywal configurations 
1. Honeynet public IP Addresses 
In the following, we type the external IP addresses for the honeypots. These 
are the IP addresses which are attackers: 
IP addresses: 192.168.52.22 192.168.52.23 
2. Honeynet Network 











Domain Routing) notation: 
Honetnet Network CIDR: 192.168.52.0/24 
3. Broadcast address of the Honeynet : 192.168.52.255  
4. Management Interface: 
     Third interface will be used for remote management. This interface helps us 
to remotely manage the Honeywall through SSH and Walleye Web interfaced. 
We use Eth2 for the management interface. 
IP address of the Management interface:192.168.40.7 
Network mask of the management interface: 255.255.255.0 
Default gateway for the management interface:198.168.40.1 
DNS server IP for honeywall gateway :192.168.40.2 
SSHD listening port: 22 
Space delimited list of TCP ports allowed into the management 
interface:22 443 
Space delimited list of IP addresses that can access the management 
interface:192.168.40.0/24 
5.          Firewall Restrictions: 
The Double-Honeynet configured to perform unlimited outbound 
connections as mentioned in (5.2) above.  
6. Configure Sebek Variables 
           Sebek is a data capture tool designed to capture the attackers’ activities 











honeypots; its purpose is to capture all of the attackers’ activities (keystrokes, 
file uploads, passwords), then covertly to send the data to the server. The 
second component is the server which collects the data from the honeypots. 
The server normally runs on the Honeywall gateway.   
Destination IP address of the sebek packets:192.268.52.20 
Destination UDP port of the Sebek Packets:1101 
7.   Honeypots Configuration 
Below are the details of the Honeypots machines properties and configuration. 
 Honeypot 1 
 Machine properties: 
o Operating System: Windows XP 
o Number of Network Card: 
We use one network card Eth0. 
o IP Address:  
Eth0: 192.168.52.22 
 Honeypot 2 
 Machine properties: 
o  Operating System: Ubuntu linux 9.10 
o Number of Network Card: 
We use one network card Eth0. 











 Eth0: 192.168.52.23 
2.5 Honeynet 2 Configuration      
              Honeynet 2 contains Honeywall and two Honeypots. Honeynet 2 function is to capture 
polymorphic worms instances. Below are the details of the Honeywall machine properties and 
configuration. 
 Machine properties: 
o Number of Network Cards:  
 Three network cards (Eth0, Eth1, and Eth2). 
Eth0 function is to connect Honeynet 2 with Honeynet 2 through Internal Router. 
Eth1 function is to connect Honeynet 2 with his clients (Honeypots). 
Eth2 used for Management interface. 




o Honeywall configuration  
1. Honeynet public IP Addresses 
In the following, we type the external IP addresses for the honeypots. 
These are the IP addresses which are attackers: 
IP addresses: 192.168.59.22 192.168.59.23 











In the following, we type the Honeynet network in CIDR (Classless Inter-
Domain Routing) notation: 
Honetnet Network CIDR: 192.168.59.0/24 
3. Broadcast address of the Honeynet : 192.168.59.255 
4. Management Interface: 
          Third interface will be used for remote management. This interface 
helps us to remotely manage the Honeywall through SSH and Walleye Web 
interfaced. We use Eth2 for the management interface. 
IP address of the Management interface:192.168.40.8 
Network mask of the management interface: 255.255.255.0 
Default gateway for the management interface:198.168.40.1 
DNS server IP for honeywall gateway :192.168.40.2 
SSHD listening port: 22 
Space delimited list of TCP ports allowed into the management 
interface:22 443 
Space delimited list of IP addresses that can access the management 
interface:192.168.40.0/24 
5.          Firewall Restrictions: 
The Double-Honeynet configured to perform unlimited outbound 
connections as mentioned in (5.2) above.  
6. Configure Sebek Variables 











 Destination UDP port of the Sebek Packets:1101 
7.  Honeypots Configuration 
Below are the details of the Honeypots machines properties. 
 Honeypot 1 
o Machine properties: 
 Operating System: Windows XP 
 Number of Network Card: 
We use one network card Eth0. 
 IP Address:192.168.59.22 
 Honeypot 2 
o Machine properties: 
  Operating System: Ubuntu linux 9.10 
 Number of Network Card: 
We use one network card. 
 IP Address: 192.168.59.23 
2.6 Signature Generator Configuration   
             The function of the signature generator is to generate signatures for polymorphic worms 
instances which were collected by the Double-honeynet system using algorithms that were 












 Machine Properties:  
o Operating System: Ubuntu linux 9.10 
o Number of network cards: 
One network card Eth0.  
o IP  address:  
Eth0: 192.168.55.22  
 
